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Abstract
The organization of work in garment factories has traditionally prevented employees
from exercising discretion. Clothing plants have long featured a rigid division of labor and
strict monitoring of individual output. Since the late 1970s, American garment workers
have also experienced high rates of displacement, as a result of many manufacturers'
decision to use low wage offshore sites for the production and assembly of their goods. In
recent years, demands for rapid delivery and timely responses to fashion trends have
created a new set of pressures for apparel makers. Select companies have responded by
experimenting with non-traditional production techniques, and while these practices are
widely believed to improve the treatment of workers, little research has been conducted to
verify this assumption.
This thesis examines one manufacturer's attempt to reform work in its sewing
factories. Levi Strauss and Company, the world's largest apparel maker, is in the process
of replacing its plants' assembly lines with cross-trained teams in an Alternative
Manufacturing System (AMS). Under AMS, sewing machine operators rotate jobs, help
schedule production, and receive pay according to group output.
In this study I present findings on the effects of these new policies for workers in
two Levi plants in El Paso, Texas. A series of interviews with workers and managers
allows me to compare the image of the new system presented by the company with the
experiences of its employees. I explore the implications of this change for the long-term
job security of the workforce, and share workers' insights regarding its impact on their
daily work environment.
This investigation suggests that Levi's Alternative Manufacturing System is
actually a blend of the old and new. While the individual piece-rate pay incentive has been
abolished, the group-based compensation system continues to reward speed and volume,
and many workers have experienced a loss of income under AMS.
Levi has given local managers reponsibility for tailoring the new system to their
plants' needs, but they are still expected to meet the company's demands for fast
production of large quantities. Ever aware that their plants may be closed by Levi, these
managers often resort to threats of layoff to elicit workers' cooperation with the change.
This negative reinforcement, combined with a drop in income, has convinced many
workers that this change is essentially a cost cutting strategy. Employee involvement in
decision-making structures and team meetings are treated as ancillary activities that interfere
with productivity, and the benefits of task variety have not compensated for the loss of
control operators feel they have suffered. Limited by the nature of the technology and the
product mix, the content of tasks remains narrowly prescribed, and production has not
evolved into a truly collaborative process. These outcomes are not necessarily permanent,
but the lessons contained in this study serve as a caution against making assumptions about
the benefits of work reform.
Thesis Supervisor: Leticia Rivera-Torres
Title: Visiting Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Garment workers in the United States today face a bleak outlook. Their
employers are beset by rising sales of imported clothing, fluctuations in consumers'
tastes and spending habits, and stringent demands from retail vendors. These
challenges have created new strains in an industry already marked by low profit
margins and a highly fragmented structure. As a result, domestic employment in
apparel has declined by more than 300,000 since 1978 (Rothstein 1993, 70), and the
job base is projected to shed at least another 382,000 workers by the year 2005
(Dunlop and Weil 1992, 1).
Whether or not these numbers are cause for alarm, however, is a matter of
some debate. Discussions of strategies to revitalize the needle trades in the U.S. have
been absent from recent industrial policy debates, and outcry about the plight of the
industry has not paralleled that accompanying the decline of other, male-dominated,
manufacturing sectors, such as steelmaking and auto production (Rosen 1987, 23).
Some observers argue that the labor-intensive nature of garment production make it an
archetypical "sunset" industry, ill-suited to the comparative advantages of advanced
industrial nations (see, for example, Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff 1989). According
to this analysis, any displacement suffered from its departure will be short-term, as
workers go through a churning process before settling into other occupations. The
long spells of unemployment often experienced by displaced apparel workers cast
doubt on this forecast. A Department of Labor study found that almost one-third of a
group of garment workers who their jobs between 1983 and 1987 had still not found a
job after four years (cited in Rothstein 1993, 70). Currently, unemployment in apparel
outpaces that in many other industries; in 1992 it was 12.1% in apparel and 7.4% in
all of manufacturing. (U.S. Department of Labor, October 1992)
The loss of a job is often an especially devastating event in the life of a
garment worker. Firms are frequently located in small towns that offer little other
employment opportunities, and operator have less education than workers in any other
sector of manufacturing (Rothstein 1989, 17) For the women who make up 76% of
the workforce (U.S. D.O.L., op. cit.), frequent family obligations leave many apparel
workers less mobile than their male counterparts. Immigrant garment workers also
have restricted access to other fields due to their limited English proficiency;
historically, apparel has been one of the few manufacturing industries that newcomers
to the U.S. have been able to gain entry into. And while apparel has never offered the
remuneration of the rest of manufacturing, the piece-rate compensation system does
lift most workers in above ground operations to wages that are higher than those in
many other female and immigrant-dominated occupations, such as cleaning and child
care.
According to neoclassical economists, the determination of whether a job is
highly skilled or not and how it should be rewarded are believed to be based on purely
rational factors, such as the marginal productivity a worker contributes, and their level
of "human capital" or job-related learning. However, the disparity between the
treatment of apparel workers and those in other sectors with similar educational levels
and productivity defies such logic. Although apparel occupations are commonly
referred to as low-skill, the dexterity, patience, and hand to eye coordination required
for sewing suggests that succeeding as a seamstress requires considerable talent (Rosen
1987, 56). Garment assembly, in fact, entails more concentration and craftwork than
many other blue collar occupations, such as trucking, which are compensated at two to
three times the rate of apparel work.
A discussion of the plight of garment workers must address those qualities that
distinguish apparel from other goods-producing sectors. The garment industry has
resisted vertical integration, leaving contractors and manufacturers to divide production
into discrete stages. The benefits of this system for the large manufacturer are clear:
they retain control over the design process as well as over the selection of materials
that will be used in their goods, while entertaining bids from contract shops who must
vie for their business. For workers, however, this fragmentation means they are
vulnerable to sudden lay-offs and required to work for employers guided by the need
to minimize costs. Since garment making ceased being treated as a craftwork in the
1920s, assembly lines of compartmentalized work stations have been the industry's
method of organizing production. Although firms producing standardized clothing
have been able to automate some of the production process, most sewing tasks remain
labor-intensive, with 84% of the workforce engaged in direct production activities
(compared to 68% for manufacturing overall) (Bailey 1989, 5).
The composition of the labor force also distinguishes the needle trades from
other manufacturing sectors. Apparel is the largest industrial employer of women and
minorities, with more than twice as many women workers as the rest of
manufacturing, and continues its long history of employing many recent immigrants to
the U.S. The two major garment workers unions, while unable to attain high earnings
for their members or slow the growth of offshore sourcing, have been successful in
capturing a large portion of the above ground workforce., However, in the American
tradition of business unionism, they have long accepted the terms of employment set
by management, including the narrow division of labor and the piece-rate
compensation system. The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union
(ACTWU) and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) did wage
an unsuccessful battle to abolish the piece-rate system in the 1920s, but subsequently
joined with owners in a united front against non-union shops. They felt it was
necessary to cooperate with management's cost minimization strategies to prevent the
unorganized sector from gaining a competitive advantage in the industry. During this
period, the unions also began to assign their own industrial engineers to conduct time
and motion studies in effort to speed up and streamline operations. Then, as now
wages in apparel were lower than in the rest of manufacturing; in 1991, the average
weekly earnings for an apparel worker were $249, while they were $455 for other
goods producing workers (U.S. D.O.L. op. cit., 1992).
Recent turbulence in clothing markets has heightened the competitive pressures
on apparel producers, both large and small. While the ability to meet shifting
preferences has long been important for the women's garment trade, it has only
recently become necessary for men's apparel makers. These producers previously
relied on economies of scale to create large volumes of standardized goods, without
regard to fashion or niche markets. In the last ten years, growing demand for small,
customized orders, fast delivery, and up-to-the-minute fashion has led producers to
question the limits of the current system. In the assembly line, the extreme
compartmentalization of sewing tasks creates accumulations of in-progress goods
between work stations, necessitating long lead times to fill orders. Mass
manufacturers are also restricted in their product mix; they are unable to introduce a
new style without overhauling an entire factory full of equipment and re-skilling
operators trained who have been as narrow specialists.
In their attempts to cope with new market pressures, apparel firms have
pursued a number of strategies. These have ranged from locating in low-wage
regions, both in the rural south and border areas in the U.S. and in developing
countries, to adopting new manufacturing techniques. The growing use of offshore
assembly and production facilities and the need to respond to fashion trends are
phenomena which generate pressure for domestic firms, yet which are of their own
creation. Levi Strauss and Company, for example, sees its decision to source 50% of
its production offshore as a choice that is conditioned by the terms of competition in
the industry rather than one that is solely the prerogative of the firm. In the same
vein, they view the need to become more customer service oriented and better able to
change styles quickly as a response to market forces. Their stance typifies the paradox
Ian Taplin identifies: "Although...actively engaged in the generation of new demands,
from the standpoint of one firm, fashion changes are more or less exogenous." (1992,
26)
These changes have coincided with the growth of a body of literature, centered
in American business schools, which focuses on the need to remake traditional firms
into what are alternatively referred to as transformed, high performance, or flexible
work organizations. The advocates of these models generally prescribe a series of
steps that firms should take to become more responsive. These include improving
relations with suppliers and clients, becoming more customer-focused and overcoming
rigid hierarchies. Firms that are considered especially likely candidates for such
reforms are those that are able to use product (or service) differentiation as a strategy
for competing in a crowded field. At the center of many of these proposals is the role
of human resources in determining firm performance. In recognition of the valuable
potential and insight stored in many workers, many new practices expand their duties
and increase employee participation in decision-making.
While those industries and firms that have pursued the "high performance"
strategy described above have attempted, for the most part, to recoup their investments
in training and plant re-design by designing upscale products, such as the Saturn cars,
or Xerox copy machines, the clothing trade has not demonstrated this pattern. High
end or fashion-sensitive items have never been amenable to mass manufacturing
techniques, and this sector of the clothing industry has instead long-relied on the use
of small contract shops to meet their fluctuating needs. Those producers who have
more frequently heeded the call to reform their traditional approach to production are
the large manufacturers of basic goods like sweatshirts, underwear, and blue jeans
(Bailey 1989). These firms have investments in fixed capital in large domestic
factories, and they have minimized the usually high labor costs by introducing
extensive automation. However, now faced with the demand for prompt delivery and
rapid shifts in styles, they are slowly joining the ranks of other American
manufacturers in exploring alternatives - or modifications - to the mass production
paradigm.
In this thesis I examine one major clothing manufacturer's effort to reform the
traditional organization of work in its plants. Levi Strauss and Company, the world's
largest apparel maker (hereafter referred to as Levi), is in the process of converting all
of its domestic sewing facilities to team-based production, called the Alternative
Manufacturing System (AMS). The adoption of AMS is Levi's attempt to address a
number of barriers that have impeded innovation and efficiency in their domestic
plants, and the company has placed human resource utilization at the center of their
new strategy. Levi representatives present this decision as part of the manufacturer's
current customer service focus, which has made it more conscious of the advantages of
producing close to markets. While the company has been in the habit of using
offshore sites to produce most of its fashion-sensitive clothing, the need to speed
delivery time has made Levi re-consider its sourcing strategy.
The company's objectives in the new customer service credo are to fill orders
more quickly by reducing average through-put or production time, and, although the
company has a defect rate that is lower than most other American producers, they seek
improvements in quality. Levi representatives also explain that fatigue and
overexertion have led to frequent repetitive motion injuries in its plants, which in turn
are blamed for absenteeism as well as high workers' compensation costs. Finally,
introducing new styles and producing small quantities has been difficult in the plants'
assembly line structure. Employees are trained as narrow task specialists, and the
equipment is arranged for long runs of standardized goods.
In order to accomplish its goals of flexibility, timeliness, quality and safety,
Levi has introduced a number of organizational changes.' The new production system
embodies aspects of several existing models of work organization, including Japanese
lean production and the Swedish sociotechnical approach, and in the U.S., Levi studied
the Saturn plant and the GM-Toyota joint venture, NUMMI. The company stresses,
however, that this change was internally driven, by its plants' experimentation with
non-traditional manufacturing techniques. All of Levi's factories are in the process of
replacing their 100 person assembly lines with work teams of varying size, which
practice job rotation, and base the pay of their members on group output rather than
on individuals' contributions. Levi plants have reduced direct supervision on the shop
floor and instituted a system of peer monitoring, with team and cell leadership among
employees. Workers receive training in multiple sewing tasks as well as in "soft"
skills like communication and conflict resolution, and are expected to solve problems
ranging from production bottlenecks to absenteeism. Each team is accountable to
plant management to schedule the flow of its work to meet output and quality goals.
Every plant has also created off-line employee involvement structures that address
issues such as disciplinary measures and parking policy.
AMS involves a substantial commitment of Levi's resources and could signal a
major departure from the traditional organization of work in garment factories. It also
offers a possible strategy for building on the geographic advantages of domestic plants,
whose employees and surrounding community members have long felt helpless in
stemming the flow of production jobs offshore. For these reasons, its implementation
is being closely watched. For many of Levi's competitors, the central measures of this
new system's success are its ability to cut through-put time, improve quality,
overcome rigidity, and lower costs, especially workers' compensation expenses.
Public officials, in particular those located in areas with high concentrations of apparel
firms, are anxious to see companies like Levi maintain their strength as an employer.
Labor advocates are likely to focus on the way change effects workers, both in terms
of their long-term employment prospects and their day-to-day working conditions. In
addition, since approximately half of Levi factories are unionized, the role played by
organized labor in participatory work arrangements comes into focus in this case.
In this study I assess the early stages of work reform in two Levi plants in El
Paso, Texas. I address the significance of the new production system by making
inquiries in two areas. The first is an assessment of the potential this change has to
contribute to a revitalization of the domestic garment manufacturing. The second
subject I analyze is the impact of the change on the work environment for operators
and managers in the two plants.
I pursue the first question by identifying the reasons Levi chose to reorganize
work in its plants, to determine whether this decision reflects a fundamental shift in
company philosophy and practice. Given the sizable wage differential between foreign
and U.S. plants, and the possible improvements in shipping time from offshore
locations, the company's domestic workers face an ambiguous future if the logic of the
new system is guided primarily by cost containment and timeliness. Much of the
literature on high performance or flexible specialization assumes that companies
following this strategy will focus on quality and innovation rather than cost
minimization. However, it is possible that companies will adopt innovative
techniques, such as those that enable them to improve quality and timeliness, while
retaining the treatment of labor that characterizes mass production (Bailey 1993, 34).
Employers may, for example, combine these approaches by shifting formerly
managerial responsibilities to line workers without raising their pay or extending
decision-making power; or introducing flexible technology but keeping the content of
tasks narrowly prescribed (Appelbaum and Batt 1993, 17-18).
Many scholars who study work reform use economic competitiveness as the
criteria for judging the success of alternative arrangements, and interpret improvements
in productivity as evidence of workers' successful adjustment to new practices. While
the prosperity of an enterprise has great consequence for individual workers, this
emphasis tends to reduce the effects of work reform to quantifiable firm performance
indicators. Analysts often fail to investigate the day to day changes in employees
lives that are wrought by new work rules, despite the fact that their insights may shed
light on problems in their implementation, and may indicate their long-term viability.
Literature on work reform also relies heavily on employer surveys and
interviews with firm owners and managers to document trends, and to draw
connections between practices and outcomes. While data gathered from surveys are
useful in providing a general overview of trends, they may be misleading, since the
design of programs like teams or the effects of a group pay scheme may vary widely
in different settings (Osterman 1993). It is also difficult to gain an understanding of
how individual practices fit together without using concrete cases as illustrations. The
other major shortcoming in many empirical analyses is their overreliance on the
testimony of human resource managers and executives, to the neglect of front line
workers. The danger in this tendency is that employees, who are often those most
familiar with the practices that are in place, are ignored. The survey responses may
instead be from individuals who have a vested interest in the success of new systems,
and who have an unrealistic perspective on the extent of innovation taking place in
their firm.
In this case study, I provide a textured view of the effects of work
reorganization, focusing on the employees' perspective. I assess whether Levi's new
system lives up to the company's promise of job enrichment and worker
empowerment. By presenting the insight of individuals who have experienced both
traditional and alternative work rules, I contribute a more nuanced analysis than is
often found in the highly stylized discussions about work reform.
Methodology
I chose to conduct an in-depth case study in order to examine many of the
issues involved in human resource innovation. While the results using this method
may have limited applicability to other settings, I felt the benefits of providing a fine-
grained discussion of an example of the effects of new work arrangements outweighed
the disadvantages. To this end, I conducted open-ended interviews with a total of nine
operators, five supervisors, and five managers from two plants in El Paso, Texas.
These sites were selected after I made the request of a company executive to visit both
a union and non-union plant. Before meeting with the Levi representative I contacted
an ACTWU representative, to ask for their help in arranging a visit to a union site, but
they were unable to meet this request. I then decided to, ask the company for
permission to conduct research in both a union and non-union plant, since Levi's
sewing facilities are approximately 50% unionized, and I believed this selection would
present a rare opportunity to compare the implementation of a change in both types of
settings. The company granted my request, and I arranged to visit two factories in El
Paso, Texas.
I asked several of the same questions in each of the interviews, but also
allowed individuals' replies to serve as a guide in pursing further issues that seemed
particularly important to them. The interviews were conducted in a private office and
all were assured that names would not be used in the thesis, in hopes that they would
feel that they could speak with candor. (Unfortunately, workers were chosen to
participate in the study by supervisors rather than randomly selected, although the
range of responses they provided leads me to believe that my data does not reflect a
bias towards positive perspectives on the change.) I also spent several hours on the
shop floor at each site, and attended one team meeting, and one employee awards
ceremony. These latter activities allowed me to gain a feel for the work environment
in each plant, supplementing the information I gathered from interviews. Finally, at
each of the sites I also gathered data regarding wage levels and performance measures
such as through-put time and defect rates from before and after the change, and
collected materials used in for training for the new system.
At Levi headquarters, I interviewed the President of Global Sourcing, who is a
member of the company's six person executive management committee. This
interview gave me valuable insight into the company's motives in undertaking this
change, and allowed me to compare the images presented by a company spokesman to
that which I observed in the plants. I also interviewed the company's historian, who
provided me with materials about the company's background.
From the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, I interviewed the
national level staff person in charge of the Levi plants. I also interviewed one shop
steward. Unfortunately, I was unable to arrange a meeting with the local business
agent, and was required to conduct a brief telephone interview. For this reason, I do
not attempt to make conclusive statements about the role' of ACTWU in the union
plant's conversion to team work, although I indicate the areas in which it appears the
union's involvement has been decisive for workers.
Chapter Outline
This thesis is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, I use the
second chapter to explain the origins of American mass production techniques,
focusing on scientific management and the Fordist assembly line. I also briefly
describe two frequently cited alternatives to traditional American practices, the
Japanese lean production model and Swedish sociotechnical approach. The last part of
this chapter locates Levi's practices in the recent literature on workplace innovation,
which includes both case studies and surveys which document the existence of
different practices across firms.
In the third chapter I describe Levi, and attempt to explain the company's
motives in undertaking this change. I present the goals in the decision to adopt team
work, as expressed by individuals who represent different levels of the company. I
supplement their testimony with secondary sources of information about the company,
to place this change in the context of Levi's other activities. I also analyze the
relationship between the parent company and the production sites, and examine the
reasons Levi's allocation of production has changed over time.
I describe the plants' in chapter four, including their conversion to teams, and
the new features of the shop floor. The fifth chapter further describes the features of
the team system, including new human resource policy, training and job rotation, plant
performance and employee involvement. Both chapters four and five explore workers'
and managers' perspectives on their new work environment.
The final section provides my conclusions regarding the implications of this
change for workers. I attempt to answer the question of whether the team system
appears to be a successful plan for the revitalization of this sector, and whether, as
implemented, it represents an improvement in working conditions for plant employees.
CHAPTER 2: WORK SYSTEMS COMPARED
Many of the practices that typify mass production, such as piece-rate pay
incentives and assembly lines, are widely considered dehumanizing towards workers,
yet little is known about the effects of the alternative structures adopted by American
companies in recent years. Levi, like many American manufacturers, has followed a
path that began with disenchantment with mass production methods, followed by a
period of exploration and experimentation. This process involved a limited amount of
investigation into the practices of other sites of work reform, such as the Saturn and
NUMMI plants. Yet in spite of the company's claims to have rejected the logic of the
mass production paradigm, Levi's team system retains traces of Frederick Taylor's
scientific management and Fordism. As a result, workers continue to feel pressured to
perform at a rapid pace and the content of tasks remains narrowly defined. In order to
better understand the hold these traditions seem to have on the company, I use the first
part of this chapter to outline the origins and main tenets of Taylorism and the Fordist
assembly line. In the second section, I describe two much-celebrated foreign systems,
Japanese lean production and the Swedish sociotechnical approach. Aspects of these
systems have been reproduced by many American producers, including Levi, although
the learning process is often indirect. Regardless of whether individual firms
consciously emulate foreign models, the influence of particular systems is
acknowledged by both actors within firms such as Levi, and by policy makers and
academics, who often exhort American industry to apply the techniques that have
brought their international competitors success.
The final section of this chapter analyzes the scope of American firms'
attempts to break with mass production techniques. I discuss the literature which
analyzes the effects of different practices, calling attention to those that have the most
sustained effects on employee participation. I also briefly discuss some of the features
and the debate regarding joint labor-management work reform efforts. This
background helps provide a framework for interpreting the later description of the Levi
case.
Taylorism
Scientific management techniques have been applied to garment making
perhaps more than any other manufacturing activity. The labor intensive nature of
sewing and the relatively low level of technology in the industry leaves much power
in the hands of workers, who could potentially exercise control and skill in the
tradition of craftsmanship.
Frederick Taylor understood the risk involved with allowing workers to use
their discretion to decide on their own how to perform their jobs, and thus created
methods designed to separate the conception of tasks from their execution. Taylor, a
one-time machinist turned management expert, believed that "scientific" management
relieved workers of the need to think about their jobs. This was achieved by first
breaking tasks into many small steps, and second, by establishing "one best way" for
every task to be performed. Taylor felt that the customs and relationships that
characterized craftwork were inefficient, because human judgement was bound to be
less sound than the application of engineering principles to job design. Accordingly,
he devised time and motion studies as a tool to enable managers to define the content
and duration of tasks. Taylor maintained that the narrow division of labor not only
used manpower efficiently, but that the "task idea" motivated workers to perform
better than they would if given an open-ended assignment (Adler 1992, 65).
Taylor also formulated an individual-based compensation and goal system that
encouraged workers to concentrate solely on their own output. The piece-rate pay
system was designed to take precedence over any other measure of determining a
worker's worth to their employer, and to make the use of overt coercion unnecessary.
It designates an hourly base rate and a minimum level of output that they must reach,
which differed according to the value imputed to the task. After workers begin to
produce beyond the threshold amount, they receive a fee for each unit or, in apparel,
for each bundle they complete, giving individuals a direct stake in maximizing their
speed. Since the base wage workers receive is usually low, they are motivated to
work quickly.
Developments surrounding Taylor's work help explain why scientific
management philosophy elicited such a range of responses. By the 1920s, craft unions
such as those in the building trades had spent several decades building strength based
on their claim to skill and expertise. The industrial unions that evolved in the 1930s
pursued a different avenue to power; they organized the range of workers found in a
sector like steelmaking, attempting to establish uniform wages across companies
within a given industry (Piore and Sabel 1984, 97). Both of these approaches ran
counter to Taylor's philosophy that the management of each enterprise should rely
solely on technology and engineering to determine pay rates and work rules.
Unions did seek, in some cases, to erect barriers to entry around occupations,
and to strictly delineate the duties of each position. These tactics were intended to
ward off the use of non-union labor, by enforcing standards for training and skill, and
were also an effort to ensure that objective measures like seniority were used for
promotion and deployment decisions. In these cases, unions complied with - and even
promoted - narrow job definitions, which may appear anti-worker in the strict limits
they place on the individual's role. However, given the encroachments they faced
from unorganized workers, as well as the threat recrimination and favoritism posed to
their advancement, workers' felt the benefits of enforcing "job control" outweighed its
problems.
Taylor called for collaboration between workers and managers. He maintained
that rather than dispute over how to divide the wealth, all of the parties should
concentrate on increasing the firm's overall wealth (Perrow 1986, 57). All of the
members of the firm shared in the goals of increasing productivity and efficiency, he
contended, and should therefore abide by the judgement of impartial engineers.
Taylor's work thus provided a powerful ideological tool for owners and managers to
use to suppress the role of labor in setting work rules and pay rates.
The presumed objectivity of scientific management did find support among
some labor and even socialist leaders, because of the potential they felt Taylorism
offered for minimizing the role of managerial discretion in work assignments. For
labor organizers like the president of the Amalgamated Textile Workers, Sidney
Hillman, the opportunity to enhance the ability of their workplaces to compete against
the non-union sector was eagerly embraced. While Taylor did not intend that his
methods be used to entrench the role of organized labor, narrow job descriptions and
piece-rate pay structure leave unions with a well-defined set of issues to negotiate.
Socialists like V.I. Lenin who led states attempting to establish an industrial base
found the efficiency of scientific management appealing, as long as control over task
assignment and compensation was kept in the hands of the working class.
Taylor felt his model of labor management relations were well-suited to the
times, for a number of reasons. He identified three distinct groups within industrial
relations - owners, managers and workers. The growth of the managerial class was a
relatively new development when Taylor wrote, and his work was part of a growing
body of literature in the U.K. and in the U.S. that attempted to develop a science of
management. The analysis of work methods did not originate with scientific
management, however; craftsmen had regularly studied their practices in effort to
improve their skills. Braverman argues that Taylor's philosophy differed from earlier
approaches because it was not only "the 'best way' to do work that he was seeking,
but an answer to the specific problem of how to control alienated labor - that is to say,
labor that is bought and sold" (1974, 90).
Workers' idiosyncratic ways of performing their job was not seen by Taylor to
offer any value to the company. He cited two tendencies that characterized workers,
which his methods sought to contain. The first is a general laziness, which leads
workers to contribute less than their potential will allow. The second is a more
calculated effort, undertaken by groups of workers, to under-produce, in order to avoid
having their piece-rate lowered. They learned that if they consistently improved their
performance, higher levels of output would not continue to bring them rewards, but
would instead prompt management to lower pay levels.
Taylor's work also coincided with the spread of the large, bureaucratic firm,
whose size made direct oversight difficult for executives and owners (Perrow 1986,
57). Scientific management techniques provided uniform procedures that fit well with
the impersonal nature of these organizations. Again, the danger of leaving matters to
human discretion was thought to lie not only with workers, but with administrators and
supervisors, who had their own impulses, ambitions, and preferences. Taylor realized
that left to their own devices, managers might indulge in favoritism or other human
behavior counter to the best interests of the firm. The very aspects of Taylorism that
some labor advocates found attractive provoked a defensive response from some
managers. They felt, not surprisingly, that their authority was being undermined by
the use of outside experts for task assignment, and Congress held hearings in the
1920s to discuss the implications of adopting scientific management techniques
(history of Taylorism drawn from Perrow 1986, 56-58; Adler 1992; and Braverman
1974).
Mass Production
The logic of Taylorism was integral to the spread of mass production. This
system exploits economies of scale to create large quantities of standardized goods, by
establishing fixed steps and keeping the product mix constant. This allows for steady
increases in the rate of output, and reductions in producer's cost per unit.
Between 1945 and 1970, this system was effective for American producers for
a number of reasons. It was integrally linked with mechanisms in both the public and
private spheres that ensured high demand for goods. The passage of the National
Labor Relations Act in 1935 and the Wagner Act in 1937 reflected the growing power
of the union movement and the appeal that Keynesianism held for policy makers. The
government institutionalized collective bargaining, in part, in order to distribute the
gains of industrial growth. The logic of this system was based on the links between
demand and supply; producers relied on American consumers to purchase their goods
(Piore and Sabel 1984).
While they granted unions a legitimate role in industrial relations out of
acknowledgement of their need for a customer base, most traditional U.S.
manufacturers made little attempt to develop the capacity of their workforce. Their
investments in dedicated machinery gives them a strong incentive to maximize
equipment use and limit the time spent on training or experimentation. Jobs - and
often pay incentives - are designed so that workers will concentrate on speed, rather
than contemplate ways to change the process, expand their job, or improve upon the
design of goods.
Taylor's notion of task specialization has also been faithfully applied by most
American manufacturers, who routinely create separate departments for each stage in
the production and sales of their goods. Such a fragmented operation offers little
opportunity for cross-fertilization or information sharing. Those who design the
products typically has little interaction with those who sell the good, and often the
area most isolated is the shop floor. However, since for many years firms enjoyed
steady growth while they employed these methods, they felt little impetus to adopt a
less rigid division of labor.
Fordism
Mass production techniques would perhaps not have become as widespread if
their credibility was not been established by the success enjoyed by its early
proponents. One such advocate was Henry Ford. The Ford Motor Company is widely
credited for the invention of the assembly line, first used in Model T auto plants in
1914. When Ford's factory opened in 1903, the final assembly jobs were filled by
skilled mechanics, whose work required them to be mobile, and the process was
laborious and expensive by modem standards. Slowly, the tasks became more
rationalized, and workers' movements were reduced by assigning them to fewer tasks,
concentrated in one area of the car. When demand for the Model T began to exceed
productive capacity, Ford decided to reconfigure operations in his factories, and his
engineers devised the "endless chain conveyer." This allowed the worker to remain
stationary while the partially assembled cars were moved along a belt, restricting
workers' duties to a single, standardized step in the assembly process.
The assembly line succeeded in allowing the Ford Company to produce cars in
a fraction of the time the old system took, but the new working conditions met
resistance from workers. By 1913, turnover was so high that the company had to hire
963 workers to fill 100 positions. Nevertheless, assembly lines took hold in factories
across the U.S., because they offered the best method to date of strengthening
managerial control over workers' pace and output (history of Fordism drawn from
Braverman 1974, 146-150).
The Human Relations Movement
Beginning in the 1930s, professionals in industrial psychology and sociology
began to study some of the effects scientific management had on workers. The early
members of the "Human Relations" movement such as Elton Mayo, F.J.
Roethlisberger, and W.J. Dickson investigated changes in working conditions, most
notably in the Hawthorne experiments of the 1920s. While this research showed that
workers responded more to receiving special treatment from management than they did
to the actual changes in their environment (the lighting was dimmed and raised for
treatment and control groups, to test whether productivity would differ), the initial
results lead to further research. Human relations scholars examined both group
dynamics and workers' needs, as individuals, to feel their efforts were appreciated.
These studies and the personnel programs that followed acknowledged that workers
established their own rituals, often in attempt to exercise control over their
environment and preserve social ties. Once the Human Relations researchers realized
that some of workers' behavior ran counter to the goals of the firm, they began to
advise companies to invest in services like counseling, and sponsor social events to
help workers resolve distracting personal problems and to develop a sense of loyalty to
their employer. The paternalistic firm and its personnel department heeded these
lessons and developed programs to promote stability (history of the human relations
movement drawn from Perrow 1986, 79-92).
Alternative Work Systems
In the following section, I briefly describe some of the main features of two
celebrated work systems. The first, the Swedish sociotechnical approach, is closely
aligned with the vision of many American labor leaders. The second, the Japanese
lean production model is perhaps more appealing to managers and owners. Both
contain elements that bear on my discussion of the blend of practices embodied by
Levi's Alternative Manufacturing System.
The Sociotechnical Approach
The modem origins of teams in the workplace can be traced to research
conducted in the 1950s by the Tavistock Institute in England. The most famous study
monitored coal miners, comparing the performance of those who worked
independently, scattered along a wall, to small groups of miners who worked together
on one area of the wall (long wall units vs. the short wall method). When the
performance of the short wall method was judged superior, the team structure was
credited. Further research explored ways of combining workers' social needs with the
technical demands of production work.
The sociotechnical system became attractive to Swedish firms after a coal
miners' strike in 1969 as well as ongoing problems with-tumover and absenteeism
convinced them of the need to improve labor relations and increase quality and profits.
The first well-documented implementation of the sociotechnical approach came in
1970s, when Volvo applied many of its features. The Volvo plants were largely
successful in achieving these goals through their use of self-directed teams, gain-
sharing financial incentives, and a no-layoff pledge. Spurred to develop strategies to
attract workers during a labor shortage, other Swedish companies began to apply the
lessons learned in the coal miners study.
As Sweden's union density suggests (75% in white collar, and 95% in blue
collar occupations) (Levine and Tyson 1990, 230) any new work system must include
a role for organized labor if it is to be implemented widely. The passage of
codetermination laws in the 1980s codified the rights and responsibilities of workers
and management in the Sociotechnical workplace, and gave the system the legitimacy
it needed to be adopted on a broad scale.
The sociotechnical system has been guided by the features of Swedish
corporatism as well as by many firms' market strategy. Employers are constrained by
'In the U.S., aside from a General Foods plant in Topeka, Kansas that instituted group
work in the 1960s, team manufacturing did not appear until the 1980s (Appelbaum and
Batt 1993, 100).
the standard and relatively high wages established for each sector in Sweden, and are
therefore unlikely to pursue the cost minimization approach demonstrated by most
American manufacturers. Unable to undersell goods from competitors operating in
countries with lower labor costs, Swedish companies attempt to differentiate their
products by their quality and distinctive nature. Thus their decision to organize
workers in teams was not purely made to appease labor, but was perceived as
consistent with, and even necessary to, their product strategy. Firm managers believed
that the degree of customization and quality they sought could only be achieved if
they allowed workers to engage in continuous improvement with minimal managerial
interference.
Analysts attribute the success of sociotechnical workplaces to both the
autonomy granted to individual workers, and to the holistic approach towards job
design. Rather than maintain a static sequence of steps, the sociotechnical model
allows workers to use their judgement and their cross-training to vary their operations.
Further, as mentioned, the unemployment rate (under 5% for most of the 1980s) has
forced employers to craft policies that will attract and retain their workforce.
Sociotechnical teams function semi-autonomously, and often each team is
responsible for the assembly of an entire good. They maintain a distinct role for
management, but much of the planning and control is devolved to the work group
level. Cross-training allows workers to vary their role within the team, and the goods
represent a collective process, rather than an amalgamation of discrete steps. The
training is designed to make workers cross-functional; it imparts both production and
related skills, such as staff scheduling, parts ordering, and machine repair. Within the
direct production sphere, workers' expertise grows, and the impact of absenteeism is
mitigated as a consequence. In fact, some Swedish firms suffer from absenteeism as
high as 20% on an regular basis, which is blamed by some of its critics on the
sanctions that make it very difficult for employers to fire employees. This has
stimulated some firms to provide interesting work as well as to make sure employees
are versatile enough to fill in for one another.
The Lean Production Model
In Japan, as in Sweden, the dominate method of work organization reflects the
national environment that industry operates within. The availability of "patient
capital" from banks allows firms to pursue activities like training that may not yield
immediate results. The enterprise-based union system fits with the dominant culture's
ideology of identification with one's employer. And, like in Sweden, many of the
human resource practices adopted by large firms have been described as a response to
the tight labor market.
As in the sociotechnical approach, Japanese firms' team members communicate
with engineers, designers, marketing staff, and other departments as needed, to
eliminate wasteful steps and identify ways to improve the production process. They
offer suggestions when they participate in quality circles and through use of the ringi-
sho system, which entails sending ideas in an upward spiral, gaining approval at each
managerial level before they reach the final decision making authority. The ringi-sho
practice recognizes that workers often have valuable insight, but it uses a formal
procedure to achieve consensus on specific proposals, rather than allow individuals to
act independently on their ideas. As a result, workers are not as autonomous as they
are in the sociotechnical system, and the chain of command is diffuse, but still intact.
The compensation system in large Japanese firms is designed to develop
identification with the employers' goals. Workers are paid yearly bonuses based on
firm profits, but these are often broken down by work group contribution. The
dispersion of wages between the blue collar workers and managers and executives is
also narrow relative to the typical American company, and this is believed to foster
commitment2 (Levine and Tyson 1990, 225).
The production process both within and outside of the plant is streamlined in
the Japanese model. In their external relations, Japanese firms try to buy parts from
2In the U.S., while many employers have recognized the benefits of removing "in
your face" status markers such as separate parking lots and cafeterias, the distribution of
pay remains skewed (Blinder and Krueger 1990).
sources nearby, developing regional production networks, instead of utilizing suppliers
located throughout the world. Inside the plant, eliminating excess inventory is the
purpose of the just-in-time or kanban system. The sparse factory floor is believed to
make problem areas more easy to spot, and to compel workers to address them.
While the mass production assembly line typically uses buffers of partially complete
units to allow workers to function independently of one another, lean production
maintains a smooth and as-needed flow of goods through the manufacturing process.
In contrast, the mass production model finds excess inventory instrumental, for it
ensures that workers will always have a surplus of goods awaiting their task. In lean
production, each worker's effectiveness hinges on the efforts of others, and mistakes
and changes in pace have far-reaching effects, leading to its designation as a "fragile"
system (MacDuffie and Krafcik 1992).
Japanese workers' high commitment and motivation is attributed, in part, to
employers' tradition of guaranteeing job security. Japanese workers are free from the
worry that the ideas they contribute towards making their workplace more efficient
will result in job loss. In the case that firms face a decline in business, they use the
time to train, or may transfer employees to other sites.
Cross-training and job rotation in Japanese teams occurs less extensively than
in the Sociotechnical system. Teams function with their own productivity quotas, and
they must make do when members are missing. As a result of this interdependence,
absences can disrupt the flow of work, causing delays, and effecting pay if it is based
on output. Thus group peer pressure is one of the keys to assuring workers'
attendance.
Total Quality Management
Ironically, two Americans are among those credited with contributing to the
development of the Japanese lean production system. In the 1980s, Deming and Juran
both wrote books advocating the use of customer-oriented managerial techniques
focused quality and efficiency. Japanese firms embraced their message by combining
statistical quality control methods with the just-in-time inventory system, to assure a
smooth flow of parts through production.
Total Quality Management (or TQM) addresses managers' inability to take
advantage of the wealth of knowledge stored in workers. This approach does not,
however, call into question the hierarchical division of labor, and while workers'
responsibilities grow, their autonomy does not. Their suggestions are solicited
informally and in problem-solving groups, which often bring together staff from
various departments. In American firms that use TQM, competition among workers
for the best workers ideas are often held, with rewards given to the worker who
proposes the best idea (Appelbaum and Batt 1993, 104-107).
Training for TQM emphasizes, not surprisingly, skills related to quality and
efficiency. The rote nature of jobs is identified as an obstacle to continuous
improvement, since it inhibits the range of contributions workers can make. As a
result, production duties grow to include inspecting goods that are in progress and
reporting bottlenecks. Like the lean production system, most companies using TQM
still employ foremen or supervisors who direct the flow of work and communicate
employees' ideas to higher levels in the hierarchy.
Innovations in the United States
In the U.S., the recent decades have witnessed many efforts to overcome the
legacy of scientific management. The end of the post-war economic growth in 1970,
and the not unrelated onslaught of international competition have led many employers
to experiment with alternatives to mass production. The 1980s have been described as
a decade of turbulence and innovation in the workplace (Kochan, Cutcher-Gershenfeld,
and Verma, 1991). These innovations have ranged from the "quality circles" first
established in the 1970s, to joint union-management reorganization schemes in the
1980s to recent calls for enterprise-based forms of non-union employee representation.
Many scholars have conducted research to identify the most effective practices within
the broad realm of work reform. (Effectiveness is usually assessed by testing the
correlation between various programs and improvements in firm performance.) This
literature consists of both in-depth case studies and meta-analyses of employer
surveys.
A few caveats are necessary before I present some of the highlights of this
research. First, since the many studies on work reform may each define structures like
teams differently, it is sometimes difficult to draw conclusions about common findings
(Osterman 1993). A second problem is that most of these surveys are sent to human
resource managers and executives rather than front line workers. The danger from
relying on their responses is that employees, who are often those most familiar with
the practices that are in place, are ignored. The survey responses may instead be from
individuals who have a vested interest in the success of new systems, and who have an
unrealistic perspective on the depth and breadth of innovative activity in their firm.
And third, since most studies are before and after comparisons of firm performance, it
is likely that at times, an observed impact stems from the effects of other,
simultaneous changes, such as the introduction of new technology or leadership.
Finally, some critics are skeptical about assumptions they feel proponents of
the "high performance" model make about what workers respond to. They argue that
the link between satisfaction and performance has never been conclusively proven.
Charles Perrow cites a 1968 review of a group of workplace studies, which concluded
that "what causes job satisfaction for one person need not cause it for another. Job
satisfaction is relative to a large number of alternatives available to the individual and
affected by job level, age, sex, education, culture, job cycle time, and the respondent's
standing in his or her group" (1986, 91).
Contrary to many scholars and policy makers inclinations, some research also
challenges the notion that workers always prefer variety to routine. During the 1970s
and 1980s neo-Marxists like Michael Burawoy and Louise Lamphere conducted
ethnographic research to learn more about shop floor dynamics. Many of these "labor
process" studies found that retaining control over one's work - rather than the precise
content of tasks - takes on primary importance for many factory workers. After
working in a brewery and observing that many workers resisted taking multifaceted
task assignments, Clark Molstad discovered that, "workers often seek routine jobs as a
method of avoiding more complex situations in which responsibility exceeds control"
(1976, 60).
Notwithstanding the limits of the literature on work reform, it yields many
notable findings. It offers insight into the type of non-traditional policies being
implemented within firms, and frequently identifies relationships among practices. In
one recent survey, Paul Osterman (1993) used Dun and Bradstreet files to conduct a
survey of 694 private sector establishments with 50 or more employees. He found that
32% of manufacturing establishments were using teams with at least 50% of their
workforce. Osterman also discovered that firms which compete on an international
basis were much more likely to innovate, but found no relationship between the
presence of a union and the extent of innovative practices. Eaton and Voos (1992)
analyzed survey responses from a 1987 Government Accounting Office database, and,
contrary to Osterman's findings, claim that union firms are much more likely to adopt
and sustain employee participation plans. In an extensive examination of existing
survey results, Appelbaum and Baum estimate that one-fourth to one-third of all firms
have made significant changes in how workers are organized, and about one-third of
all firms have some kind of quality programs in place (1993).
These statistics, however, tell us little about the reasons some work reform
efforts fail while others succeed. In attempt to develop theories and models that shed
light on this area, analysts use several criteria to judge the effectiveness of employee
participation plans. These consist of the incentives employer's offer to workers,
financial or otherwise; the type and amount of skill instruction they provide; and the
structures that facilitate employee involvement in decision-making, problem solving
and job design.
Incentives
Conventional means of eliciting effort from employees rely on financial
incentives (usually based on individual output), close monitoring of workers' progress,
the possibility of promotion, and coercion (Bailey 1992). In recent years, while
examples of innovative pay schemes are widely reported, Appelbaum and Baum find
that in many cases, changes in firms' compensation systems have not accompanied the
introduction of other new practices. While significant experimentation in alternative
pay schemes has taken place in the last decade, they also report that many companies
are using re-organizing or "re-engineering" as an opportunity to cut labor costs. This
may entail the creation of more part-time and temporary positions, the introduction of
a two-tier wage system, or the use of a pay for skill plan (1993, 93).
The evidence from those firms that have instituted non-traditional pay
structures leads scholars to make several general conclusions. First, employees may
grow resentful if they expend effort learning new skills and adapting to flexible work
rules but are not allowed to reap any of the benefits that accrue to their employer.
Gain-sharing is cited by some analysts as the optimal variable bonus system (Levine
and Tyson 1990, Eaton and Voos 1992), while others caution that it raises "a host of
potentially contentious issues," such as opposition from middle management (Kochan,
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and Verma 1991). While profit-sharing is also considered an
innovative bonus system, many scholars argue that a firm's profit may be determined
by events beyond the control of individual workers, and thus the profit-based bonus is
ineffectual as an incentive.
Appelbaum and Batt (1993) point out that changes in pay can either induce
employee participation and commitment, or result in demoralization and embitterment.
They explain that if workers feel that the new method of compensation in their
workplace is unfair, they will be less likely to embrace organizational reforms. For
example, large pay discrepancies between different jobs and goals that are set too high
both dampen workers' motivation. In the case of group-based pay, Appelbaum and
Batt argue that "targets that are constantly moved upwards are intended to induce
"continuous improvement" but workers may perceive management as manipulative of
the system" (1993, 94).
Skills
Structures such as quality circles and work teams often demand a range of
competencies from workers, as well as from managers. Skills that are considered
instrumental for new work arrangements include broad technical expertise and related
duties, such as repair and inspection; problem solving and communication skills; and
the ability to make administrative and financial plans.
The absence of a career ladder or monetary reward for becoming more skilled
in many production jobs is blamed for some workers' apathy towards training.
Employees may resist learning if they fear their knowledge will not be applicable in
their next worksite. The lack of job security many workers experience thus helps set a
low skill equilibrium in place; workers hesitate to invest energy in acquiring firm-
specific skills while their employers are reluctant to spend money on training workers
who may walk away with their investment. This has lead to proposals ranging from
state subsidies for firms that engage in significant amounts of training to the adoption
of an apprenticeship system to education reform (Osterman and Batt 1992).
The current void in company-provided training has left many employees
underprepared for new work arrangements. Workers are then unlikely to fulfill the
mandate of these structures, and are weakly attached to their survival.
Structures for Involvement
Quality Circles/Quality of Work Life Committees
Both quality circles and quality of work life committees were, in part, a
response to the perception that workers were alienated and suffering from the "blue
collar blues." Quality Circles (QCs) and Quality of Work Life committees (QWLs),
first implemented in the 1970s, are designed to tap into workers' store of knowledge,
particularly about the production process.
Many labor advocates have been suspicious of QCs and QWL groups, which
were often begun by companies in plants in "greenfield" or non-union areas, perhaps
in hopes that initiating their own employee organization would forestall union
organizing efforts. Skeptics' misgivings about QCs and QWLs are often confirmed by
their limited scope. As Appelbaum and Batt note, the issues they address generally
"focus on workers' local concerns - on the work environment, including health, safety,
and "cosmetics," not on the way the work is done" (1993, 110). Since many are
influenced by the Japanese approach to employee involvement, they frequently leave
the power to make decisions vested in managers and foremen. Some observers, have,
however, noted that despite a narrow focus at their outset, QCs and QWLs have
sometimes opened the way to more expansive forms of employee involvement
(Kochan, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and Verma 1991). As a result, in more recent years,
unions have begun to accept and participate in QWL groups, sometimes even initiating
them.
Strategic Decision-Making
Participation in strategic decision-making offers workers the opportunity to
have a voice in discussions on matters such as the choice of technology, plant
location, the use of sub-contracting, and product design. Levine and Tyson (1990)
differentiate between consultative, substantive and representative roles for labor in
decision-making; Eaton and Voos (1992) use high, medium, and low levels of worker
involvement to classify participatory programs. The consultative or low level of
involvement consists of informing staff of plans and goals, without extending to
workers a means of affecting outcomes. Companies that create a substantive or
medium role for workers confer with them as their managers and owners weigh the
firm's options. A high level or representative form of participation gives workers a
formal role in decision making, often through the election of a union member to joint
boards, or through collaborating on a change from its early stages, as in the case of
the GM-Saturn and Coming plants.
Much as companies need to offer adequate levels of training, they must provide
access to information and the time for workers to evaluate firm data to make employee
participation meaningful. When it has been extensive, information sharing and
participation in decision-making have both been linked to increasing employees' trust
and commitment to organizations. Accordingly, in some cases they have been found
to make employees more likely to accept concessions in wages and changes in work
rules. Conversely, workers who are summarily told that their employer has decided to
eliminate jobs or lower pay are likely to become cynical about the benefits of
participation (Bailey 1992). These effects have lead analysts to hypothesize that
employers benefit from employee involvement plans because they increase workers'
identification with firm goals (Kochan, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and Verma, 1991).
Joint Labor-Management Efforts
Some scholars as well as many labor leaders argue that union presence
provides an autonomous structure for employees, giving workers formal protection and
voice, and aiding in establishing industrial democracy. Unions are also posited as a
means of making a business more efficient. This is explained by Wolfgang Streeck as
a function of the diverse perspective that workers are able to provide, and he compares
the behavior of the unfettered manager or owner to "a king who needs to be
constrained by a powerful citizenry in order to be able to accomplish what he would
like to accomplish" (1993, 172).
While scholars have recently advanced proposals for non-union employee
organizations, others fear that such structures are susceptible to management
domination. Recent supreme court decisions have left the future of employee
involvement in policy-making unclear, as they have reinforced the notion of mutually
exclusive roles for labor and management (Stone 1988).
Despite their uncertain legal status, many labor-management cooperation efforts
are currently underway. In Negotiating the Future: A Labor Perspective on American
Business, Irving and Barry Bluestone (1992) call for an "enterprise compact" between
labor and management, designed to take advantage of each groups' strengths.
Workers, according to the Bluestones, have relatively long time horizons, and they can
offer valuable insight into ways to improve the production process. Managers, on the
other hand, have a more sophisticated grasp of the competitive conditions surrounding
the firm, but often demonstrate a short-term perspective. The Bluestones urge
employees to identify more closely with the fate of their workplace, by adopting
practices such as making quality a strikable issue.
This approach has been criticized, however, for leading workers away from
collectivity and towards a more narrow focus on the market position of the individual
firm. This is a dangerous trend, according to Jack Metzgar (1993) and others, because
it obscures workers' understanding of their vulnerable position in a purely market-
driven system. The solidarity based on the shared interests among workers across
firms (and across borders) may be weakened by enterprise compacts and non-union
forms of employee representation, these critics argue.
Many joint labor-management reorganization efforts have been undertaken in
the U.S. in recent years. The GM-UAW Saturn plant presents perhaps one of the most
thorough examples of worker involvement in the design and implementation of a non-
traditional, team-based production system. The participation of workers has been
institutionalized in processes ranging from the hiring of line workers to the selection
of parts suppliers. Communication between divisions is also integral to Saturn's
overall competitive strategy, as product design, marketing and sales and manufacturing
divisions share information regularly in attempt to respond to changes in demand and
problems in the production flow.
Another project with both the participation of the UAW and GM is the
NUMMI plant in Fremont, California. This joint venture between Toyota and General
Motors began in 1982, with significantly less union involvement in the planning stage
than the Saturn case. The factory that formerly occupied the NUMMI location was
notorious for a history conflictual relations between workers and managers, and had an
absentee rate of 20-25%. The new plant, in contrast, has adopted measures intended
to foster cohesion and since Toyota was responsible for the design of the production
process, it resembles the Japanese model described earlier. NUMMI has work teams;
however, workers still answer to a foreman, and the content of tasks is standardized.
Paul Adler (1992) argues that because workers help set task requirements and are
allowed to revise them, they feel less oppressed by their standardized nature.
NUMMI has not received such favorable reviews from all observers, however.
Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter (1988) contend that the plant's teams are used to
create "management by stress," displacing some of the "hassles" of being a supervisor
onto line workers, while maintaining managerial prerogative (16). Such views and
those that have been described earlier in this section demonstrate the complexity of the
current debate regarding work reform.
The preceding chapter has provided both a historical and comparative context
for analyzing the Levi case. The remainder of this thesis will focus on the specific
details of the two plants and their conversion to team manufacturing.
CHAPTER THREE: LEVI STRAUSS AND COMPANY
To the outside observer, Levi Strauss and Company appears to have little incentive
to spend millions of dollars overhauling its manufacturing system. The world's largest
apparel maker, Levi enjoyed record sales of $5.5 billion in 19921, and its products are
available in over 75 countries. The company's size has allowed it to require six month
advance commitments from retail accounts, and it has encouraged overcapacity among its
suppliers. The recognition of the Levi brand name makes the company the envy of many
of its competitors, and its jeans have inspired widespread imitation, including an active
trade in counterfeit Levis. The fact that Levi's most popular items are those whose style
has changed the least in 20 years has given the company little impetus to adopt
manufacturing techniques designed for shifting trends.
Given this record, what explains Levi's decision to adopt an "Alternative
Manufacturing System?" To understand the company's strategy, I conducted interviews
with one executive manager, one regional manager, and two plant managers as well as at
least two other members of management staff from both sites. The analysis in this section
also reflects less formal conversations with several other Levi staff, including the
company's historian and a controller. I place the statements of company officials in the
context of Levi's history and their current standing in the industry. This background helps
draw attention to features of the company that may distinguish it from others in the field,
and identifies some of the options and barriers that condition its behavior.
This examination of Levi managers' views also reveals the range of interests and
pressures that led to this change in the production system. While the company presents a
coherent set of goals guiding its actions, the picture that emerged from my discussions with
these managers was more complicated. The relative importance individuals in the company
assign to different aspects of the new system and to the reasons for its adoption also may
1 Net earnings in 1992 were 337.3 million dollars.
reflect their stake in its success. As Paul Adler has observed, organizations are "complex
realities whose dynamics are overdetermined and not typically amenable to a mono-causal
explanation." (1992, 74). The multiple goals and interests embedded in the decision to
implement team manufacturing defies notions of monolithic managerial strategy, and
demonstrates the importance of exploring the black box of the firm.
Background: Levi Strauss and Company
The history of Levi Strauss and Company is the story of a business that has grown
steadily, from a regionally based outfitter to an international corporation. Along the way,
Levi has adapted its product mix and manufacturing process to meet changes in the market
place and to better compete in the industry. This pattern is evident in its adoption of a
Henry Ford-inspired assembly line in 1926; in the transfer of 50% of its manufacturing
offshore; and in the current application of teamwork in the domestic Levi factories. This
section outlines the evolution of Levi, corresponding to two divisions in the company, the
parent company or the merchandiser, and the manufacturing department (the plants).
The Parent Corporation
Founded in 1847 as a dry goods wholesale business, Levi began to manufacture
work pants for Western miners soon after. The major growth in the company's domestic
sales began in the 1930s, and demand was piqued by the scarcity of Levi's jeans during the
second world war, when their products were declared essential commodities by the U.S.
government, and sales were limited to defense workers. The company ceased selling dry
goods in 1948, and opened over 30 sewing plants in the South and Southwest during the
1950s and 1960s. In 1968, Levi began to produce women's clothing, and also began
aggressive sales efforts in Europe and Asia. To their delight, Levi's brand blue jeans
became indispensable to teenagers throughout the world; the company attributes the
popularity of Western movies as well as idols Marlon Brando and James Dean for giving
denim its new appeal in the 1950s. Levi now produces for three markets, men's,
women's, and youth; within these, they sell jeans as well as other garments.2 They
acquired the Brittania line of jeans in 1986, which they sell to the mass market retail chains
like Wal-Mart and K-Mart. Their "Dockers" line of lightweight cotton slacks and
coordinates, introduced in 1986, has been a huge success for the company.
Relatives of founder Levi Strauss have run the company throughout its existence,
with the exception of CEO Robert Grohman (from 1981 to 1984). Levi has also been
owned by family members for most of its history; it was a publicly-traded corporation from
1971 until 1985. During this period, the company attempted to increase market shares by
expanding its product mix to include ski clothes, shoes, and men's suits. This diversified
approach proved unsuccessful, and when Robert Haas became CEO in 1984, the company
returned to its staples of jeans and other casual items. Haas, great-great grand nephew of
company founder Levi Strauss, also helped organize the largest leveraged buyout in the
history of the apparel industry in 1985, returning the company to family ownership.
Haas' leadership has proven quite lucrative for the company. Between 1985 and
1989, sales increased 31%, and profits rose fivefold. Among other accomplishments,
Haas reduced the workforce by one-third, presided over the development of an electronic
order system, and instituted training in areas like ethics and diversity for managers.
Foreign sales have risen from 5% in 1966 to 40% in 1992, and now account for 60% of
the company's profits. Levi currently employ over 24,000 workers in the U.S., who are
divided among the home office in San Francisco (c. 2000), the sewing plants in the South
and Southwest (c. 17,000), and the distribution and other ancillary facilities scattered across
the U.S. (c. 5,000).
The company also cultivates an image as a leader in corporate social responsibility.
Haas unveiled an "Aspirations and Values Statement" in 1987, after a group of minority
and women employees approached the CEO to discuss their frustration with an ongoing
pattern of discrimination they felt interfered with their success. The statement declares the
2 The company is currently being reorganized into a jeans, Dockers, and children's division.
corporation's commitment to "teamwork, honesty, diversity, ethical behavior,
communication, and empowerment." Managers receive a week-long training to make sure
they understand the ramifications of working for an "aspirational company." Haas has
been lauded for leadership in AIDS awareness, and the company has adopted policies such
as domestic partners benefits for spouses of unmarried employees and child care vouchers.
The atmosphere in the corporate offices in San Francisco is relaxed, and the company
eschews obvious signs of status among its employees.
Relationship Between the Parent Company and the Plants
There is, however, a marked contrast between Levi's treatment of home office and
factory employees. In the 1993 edition of The 100 Best Companies to Work For in
America, authors Robert Levering and Milton Moscowitz point out that many of the
benefits that earn the company praise are not extended to the 80% of their staff who work
outside of corporate headquarters. 3 The views held by plant managers also make clear
that the association between the factories ("sourcing sites") and the parent company is less
familial than the Levi image suggests. Levi owns and operates 27 sewing plants in the
U.S. (and uses several independent contractors, mainly for overflow orders), but considers
itself a "marketer" rather than a manufacturer, according to CEO Haas. This helps explain
why the plants have been treated as if they were "captive contractors," in the terms of the
industry, rather than integral parts of a whole. The plants are held accountable to meeting
strict budgets and order deadlines, and the possibility of being closed or losing orders to
another site is never far from managers' thoughts. Interaction between these divisions has
thus exhibited the arms-length distance that has traditionally characterized relationships in
the needle trades.
3 In an epilogue to the 1993 edition of their book, Levering and Moscowitz explain that they
removed Levi from their list of "best" employers after they judged that the company
maintained two classes of workers. They argue that the low pay, disparate vacation policies,
and Taylorist job design in the plants contradict the Levi ethos.
Levi's enlightened philosophy also failed to prevent the company from closing over
50 facilities in the 1980s, consequently displacing over 10,000 workers (Levering and
Moscowitz 1993). Company official hold that they weigh each closing decisions by
projecting its impact on the surrounding community and assessing its cost-effectiveness.
The company also feels compelled to take advantage of the low wages its third world sites
offer, in part because so many of their competitors are doing so. Although U.S. apparel
workers are able to produce more quickly (Richard Rothstein estimates that they are 26 -
44% more efficient than their third world counterparts) (1989, 16), the wage differential is
so great that Levi CEO Haas' words seem indisputable: "If only judged on economic cost,
U.S. plants are dead" (quoted in Levering and Moscowitz 1993).
While Levi closed facilities steadily throughout the 1980s, the 1990 closing of a
Dockers plant in San Antonio, Texas, brought the gap betwedn the company's
"Aspirations" and its practice under scrutiny. Anger to this closing community was
exacerbated when workers and area residents learned that the Levi enjoyed record profits in
the previous year. The company explained that the plant was not an efficient producer for
them, and that they had over-capacity, but they elicited further criticism when they
simultaneously established manufacturing of Dockers in Costa Rica, where workers receive
$1.08 per day. The San Antonio closing is described as a "painful experience" for the
company, and one that had a "devastating effect" on workers. The company nonetheless
defends its decision on business grounds, and in such cases, Haas feels that the company
is not betraying its values, but rather practicing them by being honest with employees, and
by providing extra notice and severance pay. Levi officials regret only that they had
underestimated the educational deficits of their workforce, which left displaced workers ill-
prepared for the job market. The prolonged (and well-publicized) spells of unemployment
many operators experienced following made the company appear even more callous, and
may have helped convince Levi of the need to establish the current basic skills classes in
plants.
Regardless of the justification, plant closures, and the attendant shift of production
offshore, illuminate the tenuous nature of the bond between the parent corporation and the
production sites. They also serve as an effective - if indirect - means of eliciting cooperation with
corporate mandates, and have driven plants to constant struggle to prove themselves as efficient
producers.
Location Decisions
The company's location or sourcing strategy has changed dramatically over time.
Although Levi began manufacturing in Hong Kong in 1968, as recently as five years ago,
only 10% of their goods were made outside of the U.S. Today, 50% of Levi's production
is offshore, most in independent contract shops. The company's domestic factories
concentrate on producing the company's most basic goods: 95% of their jeans are made in
the U.S. Demand for Levi jeans continues apace, but it is the growing sales of the
company's price and fashion sensitive goods that has according to one executive, "driven
the company to utilize contractors who could deliver at the lowest cost." Consequently, all
of Levi shirts are now made offshore, as are most of their women's and children's clothing
as well as 90% of the Dockers. Erratic demand for many of these products apparently
requires a workforce that will expand and contract to meet the company's needs, which, as
one Levi manager commented, isn't possible "when your name's on the door."
Growing awareness in the U.S. of the inferior treatment of workers in many third
world countries used for assembly lead the company to adopt loosely defined set of criteria
for selecting production sites. In what the company believes is another indication of their
commitment to ethical behavior, Levi introduced "Terms of Engagement" in 1990,
ostensibly to help them make location or sourcing decisions. These terms center on
environmental practices, the use of child labor and overall working conditions, as well as
the less easily assessed "effect on brand image and corporate reputation." Similar logic is
found in the company's recently created "Global Sourcing Guidelines," which try to
combine cost containment goals with concern for maintaining the company's good name.
Levi generally pays better than most other American apparel makers who use offshore
labor, and has withdrawn their business from several plants in protest of human rights
abuses. Even with the most repressive sites removed from consideration, Levi still has
many offshore sourcing options available, and has not directed more manufacturing
onshore as a result of these guidelines. According to one executive, the central question
these guidelines provoke is: "how can the higher cost domestic plants add value?" In other
words, given the availability of low-wage offshore manufacturing, what is the rationale for
continuing to use more expensive factories in the U.S.?
Domestic Production Sites
Levi's practice of outsourcing assembly of and fashion-sensitive goods to offshore
sites has left the domestic plants with the most automated segment of the company's goods,
blue jeans. "501's," Levi's best-selling item yield the highest profit margin of any of the
company's products, and labor expenses have been winnowed down to 15% of the total
cost of producing a pair of jeans (the average in the men's clothing industry is to spend
25% on labor).
As operated since their inception, Levi's domestic factories have been poorly suited
for flexibility. The automation and the fast pace needed to carry out the 40 steps of
constructing a pair of 501s are the result of extensive time-and-motion studies, conducted
by company engineers in the 1970s. The corporation's various divisions have emphasized
high volume, low cost, and standardized procedures. Research and development
department has, for example, concentrated on reducing the labor content in assembly, by
dividing the process into many minute, discrete steps. The function of the union in this
context has largely been to negotiate piece-rate quotas for specific jobs, in compliance with
the fragmented and rigid deployment of labor. Levi's prized "blue books," kept under lock
and key by plant managers, detail the correct steps operators are to use for every sewing
task. The company also attached computers to sewing machine operators' work stations
several years ago, to further monitor output, in another application of scientific
management principles.
Rationale for the Change
The Parent Company: Market-Based Goals
Executives argue that in recent years, external changes as well as developments
inside of Levi have lead the company to the question long-held assumptions. The company
now holds that even leading clothing producers can no longer count on traditional means of
achieving success. These traditions include large production runs of undifferentiated
goods, and long lead times to accommodate the build-up of in-process inventory along the
assembly line. While Levi's status suggests that it may play a role in creating standards
in the industry, comments from company representatives indicate that it feels its choices are
defined by forces beyond the control of one company. These developments can be
described as follows.
- Increasing concentration of the retail customer base. The company has gone
from selling to over 18,000 outlets of every size to making most of their sales to
their top 50 accounts. The balance of power has thus shifted, and the large chains
in the retail sector are well positioned to set the terms of the business. These terms
include more stringent demands for delivery 'just-in-time" and so that stores can
avoid both mark-downs and sell-outs.
- Changes in consumers' taste and habits, including heightened interest in fashion,
quality, and price, and erratic spending patterns (which tend to follow cycles in the
economy)
* Industry-wide use of low cost. offshore production sites. and subsequent
disinvestment in domestic manufacturing. While major entities like Levi have
helped set this trend, they feel that, like catering to shifts in taste, minimizing
costs has become an objective requirement of competition.
Taken together, the company maintains, these trends undermine the logic of the
traditional Levi approach to everything from production to sales. In response, Levi
executives formed a customer service committee in 1991 which has focused on
"responsiveness." The company defines this as the capacity to fill orders quickly and meet
demands for high quality and stylish clothing. It has set a goal of guaranteeing delivery
within two days, and the company is also trying to increase its ability to fill small,
specialized orders. This entails re-organizing its network of production and distribution
facilities into regional clusters; retraining all employees in less standardized practices; and
making sure Levi's marketing division promotes the use of these services to the company's
accounts.
Meeting these goals would be difficult, however, within the limits of the company's
current production network. As mentioned, the production of the company's goods has
been sharply divided, with domestic plants used primarily to make blue jeans, and almost
all of the company's basic goods imported after assembly offshore. The rigid nature of the
assembly line requires domestic plants to undertake extensive training and re-engineering if
they introduce new techniques and products. However, since shipments from the closest
offshore sites takes 30 - 60 days, the appeal of domestic factories location has grown since
the company's responsiveness campaign began.
Health and Safety Goals
Ameliorating the health hazards associated with sewing work is also listed as one of
the important purposes of adopting teams. The repetition and pace of assembly line tasks
leads to high rates of stress and fatigue - related health problems in Levi operators, such as
carpal tunnel syndrome. Company officials focus on concerns stemming from two of the
by-products of health problems: the "moral implications" of knowingly causing thousands
of Levi workers each year to suffer debilitating injuries, and the expenses associated with
illness and injury. Workers' compensation costs in the U.S. have been rising at a rate of
30 - 40% for the last several years for Levi, requiring the company to set aside $1.00 per
unit (a pair of 501 jeans costs $3.50 to produce, in labor and materials). In addition,
illness and injury are linked to high rates of absenteeism and turnover, reduced
productivity, and it is in the company's financial interest to address this problem at its
source. (Whether Levi is motivated more by financial concerns or by their moral
commitment to safe working conditions remains unclear, if the result for workers is
improved health, the answer seems unimportant.)
Family Ownership
The company's ownership structure is also credited by its officials for allowing
Levi to undertake ambitious and risky ventures such as team manufacturing. The "short
time horizons" of the many American companies with publicly traded stock are often cited
impediment to investments in projects whose benefits may take time to appear.
Internally Driven Change
Levi recognizes that domestic plants have felt an urgent need to act to prevent
further drift of the company's manufacturing offshore. According to one executive, these
factories have felt a "visceral incentive to change; without these changes they know they
will slowly and inexorably become extinct." This threat of extinction led the domestic
factories to explore new methods of production in recent years, in search of ways to offset
the advantages of offshore production to the company. Representatives of the parent
company attribute the creation of the new system to Levi's manufacturing arm, and the
company credits local managers with conducting research and experimentation to devise
alternatives to the assembly line.
Discussions with production managers confirmed the company's assessment of
their sense of vulnerability. Domestic factories reached peak levels in their productivity in
recent years, and were under intense pressure to keep up with the high volume of orders,
yet their managers worried that there was little room for improving their performance
within the existing structure. Labor had been reduced to the extent possible, and, measured
by "standard allowed hours" (the time it takes to make a garment), the U.S. plants were
able to produce jeans more efficiently than the company would be able to match anywhere
else in the world. Production managers nonetheless felt they would be shortsighted to
assume that maintaining the status quo would assure continued business from Levi.
Plant managers are also acutely aware of the company's desire to reduce worker's
compensation costs. Until recently, Texas statute placed a greater financial burden on
employers than did most other states' laws, and this issue is still foremost in plant
managers' thoughts. In El Paso, where companies can escape many of the obligations of
the U.S. employment contract by moving across the border to Mexico, production
managers feel that spending related to illness and injury claims act as a strong deterrent to
maintaining manufacturing facilities in the United States.
While standard clothing like underwear and basic jeans has been the last remaining
stronghold for the domestic apparel trade, no one associated with the Levi plants is
confident that the company will continue to use them as a source indefinitely. Spurred by
the fear that dilemmas such as high workers' compensation costs and inflexibility would
lead to the demise of their plants, managers started to test alternatives to the assembly line
in the late 1980s. They traced many of their problems to the organization of work in their
factories, and contemplated ideas that would reduce the repetition that was leading to high
injury rates, speed the flow of goods through production, and establish greater flexibility.
In 1990, the Roswell, New Mexico Levi's factory set up modules, or small work teams of
9 - 12 operators. This plant produces women's clothes, "Little Levi's" (for children), and
the trendy "Silver Tab" brand, and is somewhat of an anomaly among the domestic plants,
in the range and nature of its product mix. Managers of this plant were perhaps even more
conscious than their peers of the need to demonstrate they could offer a competitive
advantage to Levi, given the company's habit of using offshore producers for most of their
non-standardized goods. They developed the team concept to improve on timeliness,
versatility and quality, in the hope that having these assets close to the U.S. market would
make them more attractive to the parent company.
Despite the infrequent style changes of most of the clothing produced in the
domestic Levi plants, managers felt that increasing flexibility and speed would help ensure
their survival as well. They all believed that the individual piece-rate system had to be
abolished if the plants were to lower injury rates and become more adaptable, in addition to
improving upon quality and timeliness. 2 Managers began to try out different versions of
work groups in their plants, and regional managers prepared materials in support of the
team concept, to present to the company. They presented the idea for AMS to the
company's Executive Management Committee in the Fall of 1991, who agreed to invest in
the new system.
Although he and his colleagues expended great effort in attempt to perfect the new
system, at least one production manager I spoke with feels that focusing on its details
obscures the greater purpose they had in mind. He explains that the new system is a tool
being used to overcome intransigence among operators as well as supervisors and line
managers, rather than a goal unto itself. Ideally, convincing employees to accept ongoing
change will enable plants to make incremental, team by team modifications. The company
will then, in this scenario, take advantage of this capacity by having more of its fashion-
sensitive clothing made domestically.
However, the potential for applying team work offshore gives production managers
in the U.S. little faith that they have found a panacea for the runaway shop syndrome. One
declared, "I'm counting on the guys in the Philippines and Costa Rica to come up with
something like this," and he went on to state his intent to prevent the domestic plants from
becoming complacent once they adopt teams. While the majority of offshore plants are not
owned by Levi and thus seem unlikely candidates for the company's investment in a new
production system, the company's plant in Brazil has modular manufacturing. This plant,
like the Roswell factory, has small work teams, enabling them to make a variety of goods.
Such cases leave guardians of the domestic plants with little to cling to in their
efforts to remain viable. Production managers seem relieved that the company's new
dedication to customer service makes U.S. plants desirable in their ability to get goods onto
the shelves of store quickly. Yet while delivery from overseas sites may be unreliable, the
2 However, there is a limit to the efficiency that is desirable from the perspective of the stakeholders of
local plants. Only a precise degree of added efficiency will translate into a gain for all concerned. A
production manager explained that if each factory becomes three to four percent more efficient, they will
have to close one or two of them, due to excess capacity.
prospect of Mexican sites being used more frequently, particularly in the wake of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, leaves managers doubtful about their geographic
advantage. Indeed, one company executive cautions the plants from focusing too narrowly
on their proximity to markets, asserting that "location close to our customers alone has not
shown itself to be enough."
Representatives of both domestic plants and the parent company are aware that
manufacturing in the U.S. cannot compete with offshore labor costs. One executive
reinforces this message by warning that if the plants' only strategy is to be "cost
competitive with Sri Lanka, then it's bound to fail." The presence of offshore production
has exerted downward pressure on apparel wages; they have gone from 80% to 64% of
other manufacturing pay in the last 20 years. Still, as the comment above indicates,
domestic plants have little hope of matching the wages of developing countries, and might
interpret such warnings as suggestions that they focus on offering other assets to the
merchandiser.
Yet there is a distinct emphasis on cost minimization in discussions of the new
system. In addition to allowing the company to fill orders more quickly and to improve
quality, AMS is projected to save the company over $.50 per unit in time (after 2-3 years).
This savings will be made possible by reducing spending in the following areas:
* indirect labor - the phasing out of supervisors and the elimination of
inspectors
* reduced workers' compensation costs
e likely adoption of a two-tier wage system in many plants, with the low
producers compensated at 80% of the regular hourly base rate
e fewer defective units will make it all the way through the assembly process
e increasing throughput time and speeding delivery is expected to reduce
stores' sellouts and markdowns, and increase their sales
- less reliance on overtime pay, due to the increased efficiency of workers'
time during regular hours
In fact, one executive stresses that when the gains of effects like two day delivery capacity
and lower labor costs are calculated, they "all translate into lower cost." This illustrates the
endurance of traditional criteria in the company's decision making. Minimizing cost per
unit - albeit in the long run - can best be achieved, Levi has decided, by re-organizing
work and changing the reward system. Whether this represents a fundamental shift from
traditional operating principles will be explored in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 4: THE SETTING
The choices each Levi plant has made regarding the composition of teams and
the configuration of their shop floor have had far-reaching effects on their employees.
The company gave its local managers the latitude to determine the form of teams that
would best suit their facilities, as well as to establish a timeline for their transition to
AMS. As a result, the amount of training provided and the arrangement of teams as
well as many other features of the new system are different from site to site. In this
chapter, I explain the layout of the two El Paso plants, and describe their transition
from assembly lines to teams. The picture of the setting provided in this chapter sets
the stage for the later exploration of the impact of the new system on plant workers.
Levi's 520M plant, or Airways, as its employees refer to it, is a low, beige
building, sitting amid a strip of gas stations, mini-markets, and fast food restaurants on
El Paso's Airway Boulevard. By 7:30 a.m. on a typical weekday morning, over 400
operators are busy on the plant floor, constructing Levi's jeans. Most work at a
frenetic pace and appear to be concentrating intently, despite the noise around them.
A tinny sound system plays a.m. pop music, adding to the cacophony created by the
hundreds of machines.
Across town, the scene at the 524M plant, or Cypress, is similar. The Cypress
plant produces the same goods as Airways, and generates close to the same volume.
While there are differences between the way the workplaces function, both formally
and informally, they do not immediately meet the eye.
The operators at the each of the El Paso factories produce over 1500 pair of
Levi's 501 and 901 jeans on a typical day. Until recently, most of them stayed at one
station while they worked, performing the same task over and over on each piece of
material in the bundles that were placed next to their machines. This changed,
however, by the spring of 1993, when the plants were implementing Levi's new
Alternative Manufacturing System, replacing assembly lines with cross-trained work
teams.
Levi's El Paso collection of five sewing plants, a finishing center, a cutting
facility and a regional office complex makes the company the city's largest private
employer, with a combined workforce of over 4400. In the two plants I visited,
almost all of the employees are of Mexican descent, and approximately three-fourths
are women. The average tenure in one factory was ten years, and in the other
employees had worked an average of 20 years for Levi.' In recent years, both plants
have begun to hire more men for all types of operations than they used to. Managers
believe this reflects the lack of alternatives available since widespread disinvestment
has shrunk the El Paso job base. Since the 1940s, the area has been a center of low-
wage manufacturing jobs, many involving warehouse work and assembly, and
attracting migrant laborers from across the border in Mexico. During the last 30
years, in fact, the population has shifted from being predominately Anglo-American to
its current majority of Latinos. El Paso has been home to several large manufacturers'
production sites, including the VF Corporation's Lee and Wrangler jeans, and until
they moved to Mexico a few years ago, the maker of Farah jeans. Indeed, with the
Juarez maquiladoras (assembly plants) visible from many vantage points in El Paso,
residents are acutely aware of the transient potential of their manufacturing base.
The demise of the union representing the workers at one of plants I visited is
indicative of the precarious nature of the apparel sector in recent years. The business
agent is the lone staff member for the El Paso Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union (ACTWU) office, down from a crew of ten several years ago. The
impact of the region's many plant closings as well as the more debatable role of the
union's tactics and strategy in response to changing conditions helps explain the
union's current weakened state. 42% of the workers in the Cypress plant belong to
the union, not an unusual density for ACTWU Levi's plants. All of Levi's domestic
plants (with the exception of one in San Francisco, which is kept open largely to show
tourists) are located in "right to work" states in the South and Southwest. In these
states, unionized employers must maintain open shops. (This policy mandates that
'The average tenure with an employer for garment workers is 4.2 years (U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Quarterly, Spring 1993).
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employees in workplaces with a union presence must be allowed to choose whether
they will join the union or not, leading to a "free rider" problem for unions, who
negotiate benefits for all workers, regardless of their membership status.)
The Conversion Process
The design and formation of teams in both EL Paso plants was management-
led, though to varying degrees. ACTWU representatives did participate in the team
selection process and in setting output requirements at the Cypress plant, but the union
was not part of the company's planning for the system as a whole. The Quality
Improvement Team (QIT), composed of managerial staff at each facility, gathered
their staff in October of 1991 to announce that the plants would be adopting a new
production system. Managers stressed the need to improve quality and ensure the
plants' survival. From there, the two plants followed different paths in the conversion
to teams.
Airways
The leadership of Airways wanted their plant to be the first to fully convert to
AMS (they missed by one; the Levi's plant in Blue Ridge, Georgia has that
distinction), so they set up teams in rapid succession, finishing the conversion process
by the end of 1992. Modeling the size and design of their teams after those at the
Blue Ridge plant, management decided to arrange teams of 34 operators in horseshoe-
shaped formations, with 17 workers positioned around the outside, and the other 17
working in lines that connect the sides of the U. They also experimented briefly with
a Japanese inspired kanban system in one of the teams, where bundles were broken
down, and single units were passed between operators. However, this arrangement did
not last, because it was not comfortable for the operators, and, according to one
manager, because the advisor working with the team was not committed to developing
an innovative - and potentially unsuccessful - process.
The Airways QIT selected five of the plant's most productive operators to
organize the first teams. These individuals posted sign up sheets, conducted
interviews with workers, and then formed two teams, which began functioning in
November of 1991. The rest of the teams were formed in rapid succession, often
through informal coalescing of operators who were friends and wished to work
together. As one might expect, this process left a surplus of the less efficient
operators who had not been "picked" (or who were not eager to make the change from
the assembly line). Thus the last team to form is composed largely of operators with
injuries, older workers and new hires, and the training instructor often works with its
members to try to increase their productivity.
The Airways plant has hired over 150 new workers, and continues to rely on
overtime to help offset the slowdown in productivity they have experienced after
beginning to use teams. In the past, the uneven flow of the progressive bundle system
made it possible for operators who worked at the plant's back work stations to finish
work and leave early on Fridays. Those in the front, meanwhile, were required to wait
on goods which were at various stages of assembly, and had to work overtime most
Saturdays. The current system still utilizes overtime; however, the criteria for
determining which operators will work overtime has changed, and now, it is the four
or five most efficient teams that are often asked to work Saturdays. Airways
managers plan to keep about half of the new operators they hired after the introduction
to AMS (raising the number of operators from 475 to 550), using attrition rather than
lay-offs as much as possible to reduce staff. Furthermore, while the short-term
training costs and productivity losses have made AMS appear unprofitable for plants,
over the long run it is expected to yield savings which could be used for expanding
staff. (Levi projects that AMS will save over .50 per unit over time, although it is not
clear how this will be divided within the company.) In the immediate period,
managers in both plants seem to feel that buffers of workers will help them cope with
the loss of control they feel under the new system.
Cypress
The conversion at the Cypress plant has proceeded slowly compared to the
pace at Airways. Management decided to set up a new team every two to three
months, beginning by choosing potential team members based on seniority, attendance,
and productivity records. A union-management steering committee then held
interviews and made their selections. They are aware of the danger of concentrating
the plant's most capable operators on the first teams, and, accordingly, they believe
they attempted to balance the selections.
Despite these steps, the transition to AMS at Cypress has proven to be more
traumatic for some workers than for others. The average tenure among Cypress
operators is 20 years, and many of the senior employees are not as fast as their
younger counterparts. Levi has a policy of allowing those employees who have been
with the company for more than 15 years - and who are over 50 years old - to
produce at a rate of 75% of the plant's usual quota, but one manager explained that at
Cypress, they are encouraged to produce at 85%. Company policy notwithstanding, in
several instances management has also granted teams' requests to remove slow
producers and workers with poor attendance. All of these operators were placed back
on the remaining assembly line, and their fate remains uncertain. If particular workers
continue to be shunned, the plant could be left with a reserve of the least competent
operators once all of the teams are formed. One Cypress manager discussed the
possibility of eventually placing the low-producing workers in two teams; he later
added that supplemental teams might also be formed of operators who currently work
the night shift. These operators would be held to lower productivity standards than the
rest of the teams, and would likely receive lower compensation; in fact, the union has
suggested that since their efficiency would be around 80% of the standard level, their
pay should also be 80% of what other operators receive.
The establishment of separate teams for slow workers is being considered at
other Levi plants, since resolving the matter of how to utilize low producers without
detracting from team performance has been a major challenge for the company.
Isolating these individuals in special teams would both relieve the rest of the teams of
the burden to work with them, and establish a financial disincentive for other operators
who might otherwise be tempted to let their efficiency slide. It is unclear whether this
arrangement would increase the demands placed on other teams, or how members
would feel about getting rid of low producers if they knew that be doing so, they
would be subjecting them to a permanent reduction in wages. This practice could also
signal the beginning of a two-tier wage system for operators at Levi plants, and, in
some respects, it resembles the individual output-based nature of the piece-rate system
more than it does the new group compensation model.
At the outset of the conversion to AMS, the Cypress plant hired an additional
100 operators for a new evening crew, since, like Airways management, they
anticipate a decline in productivity during the transition period. While the plant
previously relied extensively on overtime hours from the regular workforce to meet
production goals, they are now able to utilize the night shift when the regular staff
falls short. The night shift is especially important to Cypress because job rotation
entails the use of too many machines during the day to allow the new hires to work
alongside the other operators. In fact, plant managers believe that the shortage of
equipment will require that they move some of more experienced employees to the
night shift as the conversion to teams continues. While the 100 operators hired for the
original night shift were only promised temporary jobs at the plant, it is likely that
they will be asked to remain, and will form lower paid, surplus teams as described
above. Cypress managers explained that these groups would be used more "flexibly"
than the regular teams, and that their tasks would include finishing leftover work in
the plant.
Technology and Ergonomics
Levi executives describe the new orientation of the company's research and
development department as an important aspect of the change to teamwork, and one
that is still evolving. This department has, in the past, emphasized minimizing labor
content through automation and the compartmentalization of tasks. As a result, the
plants' equipment is designed for specific sewing tasks, rather than for all-purpose use.
The company claims it is now working to develop a philosophy based on the
understanding that machines should be viewed as tools to allow people to work safely
and flexibly.
The change to teams has required that plants rearrange existing work stations,
as well as bring in new machinery to facilitate cross-training and job rotation. In the
last two years, the plants have also been purchasing equipment that meets ergonomic
standards, in attempt to reduce the frequent work-related illness and injuries
experienced by sewing machine operators. Briefly, ergonomics involves fitting the
task or machine to the person, rather than making workers adjust to equipment. This
emphasis on health and safety can be traced to Levi's Safety and Fit Education
("SAFE") program, initiated in 1991, prior to the introduction of teams, but
ergonomics is frequently cited by managers as part of the team concept. SAFE
expanded the number of medical staff in plants, who educate operators about
prevention and detection of illness and injury. As is often the case, illness rates in
many plants rose dramatically in the initial period of the SAFE program, since
employees were encouraged to report pains they may have been ignoring. The Airway
plant, for example, lost between 50 and 60 operators due to work-related illness and
injury during the six week period when SAFE started, and, by the end of the first two
months, 80 Airways employees were on medical leaves. While these numbers are the
result of Levi's efforts to reduce health and safety risks, the rise in reporting led the
Texas Workers' Compensation Commission to include Levi in their list of the state's
most hazardous workplaces.
The Airway and Cypress plants have both moved away from the long lines that
characterize the traditional garment factory layout. There are 40 steps required to
make a pair of jeans, but 100 operators formed the factories' assembly lines of 100
operators. The plants previously grouped several stations for the same operations
together, so that bundles of fabric pieces could be moved through functional areas
along the line. This segmentation left operators unable to see how production flowed
beyond their section of the plant. While this was not problematic given the narrow
deployment of labor and technology in the assembly line, visibility and peer
monitoring are essential in team system. Operators who see bundles concentrated
somewhere, or notice that a co-worker is about to run out of work are better able to
intervene to balance the production line.
At Airways, the horseshoe formation described earlier affords operators a view
of more work stations than they could see while working on the assembly line. The
Cypress plant, on the other hand, has deployed two different layouts. Of the six teams
formed thus far, two use a U-shaped formation like Airways, while the other four
arrange operators in four consecutive rows. These work groups are referred to not as
teams, but as "mini-lines." Their four rows have eight operators who assemble
adjacent segments of the garment. For example, work on the front of the jeans is
done by a mini-line of operators who work next to one another, and this group passes
on their bundles to the next mini-line in the sequence. As the term suggests, the mini-
line arrangement is another aspect of AMS that preserves some of the feel of the
assembly line.
Both plants' management expressed their desire to have new equipment for job
rotation, as well as to ensure that operators work on machines that are ergonomically
sound. At Airways, they were able to add one million dollars worth of new machines
to the floor during the first year of AMS. Rearranging the existing work stations and
adding new equipment (as well as the 150 new operators) to the floor has created a
crowded floor space; the plant has reduced the square footage per worker from 90 to
75 (Levi's optimal allocation is 100 square feet per worker). Each team has 42
machines for 34 workers, a ratio of 1.2 to one, and management's goal is 1.5
machines for every worker. At Cypress, however, managers explained that they have
not had the funds to purchase many new machines, and cite lack of equipment as one
of their chief problems in implementing AMS. Nonetheless, this plant is also
currently utilizing 90% of their floor space, and some of the operators have
experienced new injuries which managers attribute to the decline in the range of
motion they are able to exercise when they dispose of (pass along) goods after
performing their operation on them.
Although the teams incorporate many of the indirect tasks necessary for
production, some of the highly skilled sewing tasks remain external to them. The
most complex equipment in the plants are the machines used for the pockets and trim
on the backs of the jeans (the "DB I" and "DB II machines;" Design Back I and II).
These machines are kept in a separate area, away from the teams, and they are not
part of the cross-training scheme. Becoming proficient as a DB I or II operator takes
more time than most other sewing jobs, due to the complexity of the machinery.
Operators must use manuals written in English, and tend two or three machines at
once, sometimes lifting heavy parts in the course of their work. Employees hired for
these positions generally have a high school degree, and are predominately bilingual
men, who receive a higher base wage than most operators.
The weight of tradition and the need to restrict changes in work arrangements
to those that fit with existing equipment prevents managers from making human
resource development central to job design and task assignment. Operators'
deployment is decided still according to machine availability and location, and thus
does not feel empowering to workers. At the Airways plant, for example, the
operators are to learn the tasks to either side of their original work station. A manager
at Cypress also explained that they assign new hires to operations after assessing their
physical traits, like arm length and height, rather than consulting with people about
their preference and capacity. The division of teams into the eight-person mini-lines
was part of both plants' management effort to cope with the unwieldy size of 35
person groups, and, while this size does seem more conducive to interpersonal
communication, it retains some of the compartmentalized nature of the assembly line.
Though efficient, these practices continue a pattern of assigning tasks primarily on the
basis of technical considerations.
CHAPTER 5: JOB CONTENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS
Direct testimony from workers and managers within the two Levi plants allows
us to compare first-hand accounts of how the team structure has changed work to the
ideal type presented by the company. The problems employees have encountered
demonstrate the difficulty of imposing an adaptable, interdependent system on
factories where job design has long been dictated by rigid technology, and where
success is measured by the volume of output.
In this chapter I report how the adoption of teams has changed the demands
placed on Levi operators and managers, as well as how it has effected plant
performance. This section places employees' statements in the context of other
empirical findings on new work arrangements, and draws on theories concerning
worker participation and job satisfaction. I analyze the significance of these changes
in light of their effects on long-term job security and the daily work environment for
plant employees. I consider whether AMS does seem to signal a departure from
tradition, and may offer a means of reversing the flow of apparel jobs offshore, or
whether it translates into a one-time revision of past practices.
I describe operator and managers' new job duties and skill requirements in
several parts. First, I discuss the expansion of workers' responsibilities into areas
formerly reserved for specialists. This includes inspection and repair tasks, as well as
the shifting of supervisory duties to production workers. I discuss the ramifications of
self-directed work teams for supervisors, and then consider the changes in plant
performance that can be attributed to AMS, examining lead time and attendance. I
next cover human resource policy, regarding benefits, hiring practices, and
compensation. I then describe the demands for competency in more sewing
operations, and the training that has been provided for both new and experienced
operators. I analyze some of the reasons mangers as well as operators offer for the
difficuties they have encountered in converting to teams. Finally, I report on the new
forms of employee leadership and involvement that Levi's team system entails, both
on and off the production line.
Parallel Duties: Inspection, Repair, and Supervision
One of the long-term goals for the work teams is a reduction of indirect or
"non-value-added" labor, such as inspectors and supervisors. In the following section,
I describe the four main non-sewing areas that have been incorporated into operators'
jobs.
Inspection
Shifting inspection duties largely to the operators represents Levi's intent to
build in rather than inspect in quality. The rapid pace and narrow focus that
characterizes garment assembly has been modified by linking pay to the quality of
goods teams produce. Individuals now have a stake in assuring that the goods they
work on are not found to have more than the maximum allowed defects (three per
hundred units). Both plants have improved their average ratings in the last year. The
rate at the Airway plant has gone from 3.5.% to 2.5% and the rate at Cypress has been
lowered from 3.9% to 3%. AMS uses a separate auditing rather than inspecting
process; every two teams shares an auditor, who checks five units out of every 60 unit
bundle they produce.
In the traditional system, plants had one inspector for every 30 operators.
Goods were checked for defects at the end of the line, and sent back to the appropriate
operator for repair if needed. (Each operator scans a bar code on a ticket that
accompanies each bundle she works on, which is how goods are traced back to her
work station.) Operators were not encouraged to look for flaws; in fact, the piece-rate
pay system gave them a financial incentive to let damaged goods pass through to the
next station. While mistakes were eventually traced back to the responsible party,
they did not affect an individual's pay. For the operator who discovered errors in a
good she was working on, sending it back for repair would reduce her own piece-rate
pay for the day, and the satisfaction from knowing that she had saved the plant time
and money would have to serve as her only reward.
Repair
Similarly, under AMS there is one mechanic assigned to every two teams,
whose pay is not tied into team output. Management in the Airways plant is
contemplating possibilities for making mechanics' pay contingent on team
performance, as a means of creating more accountability. At the Cypress plant,
however, managers believed that the mechanics already feel obligated to their teams,
and are accordingly more efficient than they were in the traditional system.
Previously, each mechanic was only responsible for fixing one or two types of
machines, which contributed to the bottlenecks in the assembly line when the
appropriate mechanic was not available to fix a machine.
Managers at the Airway plant would also like to teach operators about basic
repair and preventative maintenance, to help reduce the disruption caused by
mechanical failures. The Japanese lean production model as well as the Swedish
sociotechnical approach considers teaching production workers mechanical skills to be
an important aspect of the multi-skilling process. This area of training is designed to
take advantage of workers' knowledge about the idiosyncracies of their machines; to
reduce equipment and worker down-time, and to eliminate a layer of indirect labor.
At Levi, however, the mechanic position recently was up-skilled by institution of a
high school degree requirement, which suggests that they feel the job's duties will
remain off limits to the generally poorly educated production staff.
In the assembly line, operators were allowed to wait 20 minutes for their
machines to be fixed, and then to clock out, or to work at a modified pace, if her
machine allowed. Managers lament the inefficiency of the old repair system, in which
the operator was slowed down or even incapacitated or until her machine was fixed.
To make matters worse, according to one executive, operators periodically made false
claims that their machines were broken, in a "game" they played to buy relief time. In
the current system, they must find another station to work on when their machine
breaks, as unproductive time may hinder their teams' ability to reach quota. One
operator explained that she misses the ability to decide when she will slow down, and
recalls that requesting a machine repair enabled her to do this: "Before, if your
muscles got sore you used to be able to fill out a slip, and get a coupon, and go
slower. Now, you have to get other people in your mini-line to help you with your
quota."
Supervision
Both plants reduced managerial staff after introducing teams, and plan to make
further cuts as the teams become more self-sufficient. At one plant five supervisors
and one line manager have left, and at the other, four supervisors and one line
managers have left so far. These employees were offered a buy-out package by the
company, which the remaining managers believe gave some of those who left an
opportunity to pursue schooling or to retire early. It is difficult to surmise how these
individuals felt about their decision to leave; given the labor market conditions in El
Paso and the financial limits of the buy-out, it seems likely that at least some would
have preferred to stay at the plant. In any case, after this attrition, the ratio of
operators to supervisors has increased at both plants, from 47:1 to 68:1 at the Airways,
and from 55:1 to 70:1 at Cypress. There are currently two teams assigned to each
supervisor (called advisors or coaches at the plants). Ultimately, when teams become
fully self-managed (in three to five years, in several managers estimates), the
remaining supervisors will be required to become operators on a team if they chose to
continue working at the plant. Outside of their teams, operators' performance are still
monitored, but without the layer of supervision that traditionally directed shop floor
activities. The QIT described earlier will continue to function at both plants, judging
the merit of workers' suggestions and making strategic decisions. While Cypress, the
union plant, has a steering committee with worker representation that has a voice in
policies affecting the day to day deployment of labor (including pay, quota levels, and
team composition), Airways does not have a formal mechanism for including workers
in such discussions. Managers from both plants cite plans to involve workers in the
hiring of teammates, once the new system is running more smoothly. In neither plants
has participation in matters such as investments in new technology been extended to
the operator level.
Levi nonetheless felt that supervisors in all of the plants needed to be prepared
for self-directed workers. The company required its managers to attend three and one
half days of "empowerment training," which addressed the need to break from
hierarchical, omniscient styles of management. This training as well as the "Working
in a Changing Environment" sessions, provided for the remaining supervisors, aim to
replace the uneasiness some managers may feel about relinquishing control with a
recognition of the value in having an "empowered" workforce.
Management's Transition to Team Work
Managerial staff at both plants report difficulty adjusting to the new demands
on them. M., an advisor at the Airway plant, spoke of feeling an increase in stress
from the ambiguous nature of her new role, as well as from operators' frequent
complaints. She also described problems creating continuity in team or cell
leadership, since people didn't usually last for more than two or three weeks. (Plant
management suggests that leaders serve for one to two months.) M. explained that
operators don't want their cell and team leaders to be considered part of the team
because they are counted as fully functional members when the group's quota is set,
despite their reduced productivity. Further, her teams treat these leaders as if they are
omniscient managers rather than peer coordinators. M. feels, as do most supervisors,
that overcoming people's desire to be told what to do has been the most difficult
aspect of the change. She was in the habit of reminding them, on a daily basis, that
the plant could close at any time, a warning she feels falls on deaf ears. Finally, M.'s
attempts to get operators to serve on task forces have been unsuccessful, and this has
also been demoralizing for her.
A line manager (line managers are responsible for overseeing production on the
entire plant floor) in one of the plants shares M.'s view of the increased burdens and
"headaches" wrought by the change. She said that the demands on her have grown,
citing the need to stay late often, to finish work that she is unable to take care of
during the day because of frequent meetings.
These comments suggest that Levi managers may be experiencing "labor
intensification," a claim made by Ian Taplin in his study of the use of flexible
manufacturing techniques in Southern garment factories. Taplin found that stimulating
workers to solve problems on their own and become more adaptable - while still
meeting order deadlines - had created a new set of pressures for managers (15). While
Levi supervisors felt that the traditional system was stressful as well, their role in
assuring that deadlines were met was more clearly defined. The extreme
rationalization of steps in the assembly line left individual workers unable to be of
much assistance in monitoring the flow of parts, and made managerial coordination of
production essential (Bailey 1989, 11). Currently, Levi supervisors feel unable to
make a smooth transition to the team environment, and, like the workers, several are
fearful that the new system will cause the plant to lose orders or even go out of
business.
Managers from both plants, as well as from higher levels in the company, have
identified operators' aversion to change as one of the primary obstacles they face in
implementing AMS. Some feel this resistance is irrational, and assume that operators
cling to tradition out of fear of the unknown. However, several scholars have argued
that people who have routine jobs often focus their energy on activities outside of the
workplace, and don't necessarily welcome new demands being placed on them at work
(Fuchs Epstein 1991). Managers attribute some of the operators' inflexibility to their
advanced age and tenure, as well as to human nature, which they believe predisposes
people to prefer what is familiar to them. One supervisor believed the solution to this
dilemma was to hire younger, less experienced workers, who he could "mold" to his
liking. The same advisor commented that the difference in jobs stems from the fact




The long lead times and the undifferentiated nature of the goods produced in
most of Levi's U.S. plants has allowed them to concentrate on achieving
competitiveness through means other than responsiveness. The conventional strategy
for keeping the domestic factories viable - given the offshore options available to their
parent company - was to minimize labor content, so that it represented a small fraction
of total costs. Labor has been reduced over time to 15% of the cost of producing a
pair of Levi's 501 jeans, and the domestic plants are able to make jeans for Levi's
more efficiently than workers anywhere else in the world.
Given the company's current emphasis on timeliness, flexibility, and quality,
however, conventionally defined productivity is not sufficient reason to continue using
a factory.' Levi's goal is to be able to fill orders within two days, which increases
their need for plants that are able to produce a variety of goods for quick delivery.
The proximity of domestic factories to the U.S. market is still an asset that cannot be
matched by offshore sourcing options; shipping orders from factories in the Caribbean,
for example, takes between 30 and 60 days. This suggests that Levi plants in the U.S.
are well-advised to attempt to build on their built-in geographic advantage to the
company by speeding through-put time.
By shrinking the size of the group responsible for getting bundles through the
steps of production, and by linking teams' compensation to the completion of entire
units, AMS has been able to reduce the time it takes to process orders. Both El Paso
plants have reduced lead time, from nine to five days, and from five to two days at
Cypress. (The discrepancy is due to the fact that the Airways plant does not have its
own cutting facility, which lengthens the time they take to fill orders.)
Attendance
The new system has reduced absenteeism, long one of apparel firms' most
intractable problems. Job rotation is described by some plant managers as a means of
combatting the stress, boredom and fatigue associated with sewing tasks, and they
assume there is a relationship between the quality of work for operators and
absenteeism. Frequent absences, like repetitive motion injuries (and not unrelated)
flowed from the organization of piece-rate assembly line work. The narrow design of
sewing jobs was the apparel industry's attempt to minimize the consequences of
1 Levi is considering the use of alternative accounting measures that assign a value
to such factors as lead time, quality, and process innovation. The traditional system of
Standard Allowed Hours (SAH) is being revised to reflect the slowing down of work and
the importance of quality. However, the company's Operations Department Controller
feels that the uncertainty involved in placing a value on variables such as innovation
would create problems for a new accounting system. He advocates using a more
qualitative method such as a plant "report card" instead.
absenteeism by training a number of operators in performing the same task on the
assembly line, and by limiting the responsibilities of most workers to one operation.
Assembly lines have been called "robust" systems because they can continue unabated,
even with many workers missing. With teams, despite the fact that 35 is a large size
compared to what is found in most manufacturing work groups, operators may
significantly reduce their team's chances of meeting quota if they are absent often.
AMS can thus be said to be "fragile," since, like the Japanese lean production model
the term has been applied to (MacDuffie and Krafcik 1991), plant performance is
highly sensitive to the precise mix of workers and technology available.
Workers and managers at both plants explain that pressure applied by teams is
the primary reason for the decline in absenteeism since the introduction of AMS.
Many of the operators expressed a newfound reluctance to miss a day of work because
they are aware of the impact it would have on their group, which, unlike Swedish-
style teams, lack enough versatile members to fill in for missing workers. One
operator looked at me quizzically when I asked how absences were handled under the
team system, responding "I don't think you can be sick now."
The Cypress plant is changing the attendance policy to allow 10 absences per
year instead of 15, in a sign that peer pressure is not effective enough in
management's eyes. At the Airways plant, however, managers felt confident that they
would continue to reduce absenteeism without resorting to a new attendance policy;
absenteeism has gone from an average 2% to 1.5% since the plant was converted to
teams, while it remains at 5% at Cypress.
Human Resource Policy
Employee Benefits
Levi's has long featured paternalistic human resource policies, and the domestic
plants have increased the number of programs and services they offer in recent years.
A combination of the company's avowed "aspirations," concern for protecting the
Levi's brand name and corporate image, and a pragmatic assessment of the benefits of
fostering commitment all help explain the relatively generous benefits provided by
Levi's plants. These consist of education offerings, counseling, child care vouchers,
more comprehensive health coverage and vacation time than most garment factories
offer, on site medical staff and instruction in health and safety. In addition, practices
such as the recognition of employees birthdays, the distribution of turkeys at
Christmas, plant newsletters, picnics, and softball teams all suggest a workplace that
counters the industry's sweatshop image. In fact, several operators told me that their
friends are envious or resentful of them for working at a Levi plant; one woman
explained that when she is among new acquaintances, "I don't like to tell them I work
at Levi's, because they'll say I think I'm better than they are."
The difficulty displaced operators encountered finding new jobs after the 1990
San Antonio plant closing convinced the company that it had overestimated the
employability of their workforce. Plants now offer on-site ESL, citizenship, and GED
classes. In addition, they have an Employee Assistance Program to provide counseling
one and one half days per week, and since AMS began, more workers have sought
counsel in at least one plant.
Hiring Practices
While plant managers spoke of their interest in upgrading their current staff
with ongoing education and training, they felt that the new demands on operators was
changing the criteria they used to select new staff. More education (a high school
degree) and the ability to speak English were cited, and they also spoke in more
general terms of the need to hire good problem solvers and communicators. At
Cypress, one manager believed that in the last two years they had already begun to
hire more high school graduates than in earlier years. He contends that "it's hard to
teach someone with a sixth grade education to have a broader perspective; to
understand the business; to self-manage." The regional manager, however, cautioned
that employment discrimination law prevents plants from requiring operator a high
school diploma unless it can be proven that one is vital for performing an operator's
job. If this message is not communicated to plant-level management to another, it
could have far reaching implications for the composition of Levi's plant staff.
Compensation
Regardless of whether they work in a factory like Airways or Cypress, owned
and operated by a large manufacturer, or in a small contract shop, garment workers are
paid according to their output, in a faithful execution of Frederick Taylor's scientific
management principles. There is little development of the employee-employer
relationship beyond the parameters of their financial agreement. As Bailey (1989, 6)
has pointed out, sewing machine operators are treated by their employers almost as
subcontractors, rather than as members of the firm. The typically low base wage gives
workers a strong incentive to produce enough to earn bonus pay, and reinforces their
feeling that their worth to their employer is contingent on their contributions to output.
This identity can thus be reformed on a day-to-day basis, in response to variations in
an operator's performance. Levi stands out in this respect; its domestic plants, at
least, have low turnover by industry standards, and attempt to cultivate a distinct
identity in employees as members of the Levi family. However, until the introduction
of teams, they relied on the traditional individual-based piece-rate system.
The previous policy in place at the El Paso plants paid operators at Airways a
base wage of $4.50 an hour, and the Cypress operators were paid $6.32 an hour. They
received additional pay for the units they completed above the baseline level. The
piece-rate system enabled some operators to earn between $8 and $10 an hour under
the assembly line, according to the piece-rate paid for their operation.
However, the productivity of individual workers was not yielding positive
results for the plants as a whole. The fragmentation of steps and individuals' uneven
pace led to accumulations of partially complete garments between work stations, which
operators were neither trained nor compensated to help alleviate. Levi operators are
now paid an hourly wage, with incremental bonuses for their groups high quality
output above the base level. Like the physical layout under AMS, the details of
plants' pay policies were left to plant managers to formulate, with the approval of
their regional management. All Levi's operators, however, benefitted from the buy-out
ACTWU negotiated with the company. Levi's is making payments in three
installments which total one year's worth of the balance between each employees'
average hourly wage under the traditional system, and the new base rate wage. Aside
from the buy-out, the two El Paso factories have adopted different pay systems, which
reflect both their managers' prerogative and the role played by other plant actors,
particularly the union at the Cypress plant.
Airways' initial experience with teams convinced plant management that the
hourly wage alone did not provide sufficient motivation for operators to produce.
Once the piece incentive was taken away, workers had little reason to perform at a fast
pace. During the first months after AMS was adopted at the Airways plant, for
example, most teams were not yielding the desired output, and the Airways plant was
suffering from declining productivity. After Airways had to cede the production of
several thousand many units to other Levi's sourcing sites, management felt it was
necessary to strengthen the incentives behind the new pay structure.
The current system at Airways (as well as at Cypress) transfers responsibility
for production budgeting to the teams. The budget provided to teams is based on
management's calculations that they can afford to spend $1.17 per unit for direct labor
(a figure that is derived from the budget they are allotted by the merchandiser. The
team is allocated a budget based on productivity goals, which have been set at 85% of
the 142 bundle amount, in attempt to improve quality and reduce repetitive motion
injuries. Teams are offered a group piece-rate incentive of .10 for every unit that is
produced above the 85% amount (as long as the goods meet the quality requirement of
less than 3% DHUs).
Teams in both plants are expected to decide how they can best use the budget
to maximize earnings - for example by renting an utility for the day if they are behind;
or by paying themselves to work overtime to produce more. This is designed to make
operators accountable for the deployment of their team, and gives each member a
stake in using team resources efficiently.
Since teams at Airways have been not producing the quota level on a regular
basis, operators have been receiving the base pay of $5.50 per hour, rather than the
wage of $7.33 per hour, which management has suggested is within reach of the
teams. While the $7.33 wage is based on the assumption that teams have 34 workers
who will work 40 hours each week, the teams rarely have perfect attendance in a
week; they must cope with absences and other problems that arise, and operators' re-
skilling in different tasks takes time. Individuals on the teams have, in fact, been
required to pay for the time required for individuals' learning curve, which may help
explain operators' reluctance to have team members diverted by activities such as
cross-training. The short-term costs the teams associate with having members spend
time away from their machines has constrained their ability to become more versatile
as a group. The methods used by management to elicit worker's effort have thus far
not been fundamentally altered by AMS; at this stage of the implementation, group
peer pressure has been added to the traditional means of pay and threat of layoff.
At the Cypress plant, operators are paid a higher hourly wage than at Airways,
($6.82 vs. $5.50), but, like Airways, they are offered a group bonus if their team
produces above the quota level. Thus far, three out of six of the plant's teams have
been consistently producing enough to attain a .25 per hour bonus for each worker,
raising their wage to $7.07. The labor costs allotted per unit are slightly higher than
Airways ($1.20 per unit) and the quota is lower. However, meeting productivity goals
has been difficult for some of the teams, and several operators reported that they were
warned by management that there would be layoffs if their performance did not
improve.
Gain-sharing
In the two years prior to the adoption of AMS, Levi's implemented gain-
sharing in their non-union domestic plants. Gain-sharing has been suspended during
the initial period of AMS, but individual plants are formulating revised plans. While
gain-sharing is typically a means of encouraging workers to identify with the
performance of the establishment where they work, a company executive explains that
Levi would like to create a more sophisticated framework in the future. The company
envisions using "concurrent circles of compensation," beginning with proceeds from
team and plant level performance, and then rewarding employees whose plants devise
efficient linkage systems with other divisions of the Levi "manufacturing cluster," and
lastly, circle connecting operators to the performance of the company as a whole.
Operators' Views of the New Compensation System
While the individual piece-rate system is widely criticized for being
dehumanizing and promoting unhealthy work habits, the operators I spoke with were
largely nostalgic about the old system. It clearly provided a strong financial
motivation for those willing and able to work at levels of 120 - 150% of the base level
efficiency. These individuals, who earn between two and four dollars per hour less
now than they did in the assembly line, feel that they are under as much or more
pressure to perform in teams, but are no longer compensated accordingly. The
dissatisfaction with the new compensation scheme colors workers' attitudes about the
new system; in most interviews, it was the first issue raised when I asked operators
how they felt about working in teams. Operators regret that they have lost both the
capacity to determine their own rewards each day and in some cases, experienced pay
cuts.
Several operators described pay as the primary way they have always derived
satisfaction from their jobs. One operator stated plainly that the pay issue was
foremost because "most of us are here because we need the money." D., a 18 year
veteran of the Airway plant, said that pay was an even more important stimulus under
the team system; she was now aware that if she did not maintain a steady pace all day,
her own as well as her team members' earnings might suffer. As one supervisor
recalled, many workers initial reaction to the new system was, "why should I kill
myself for $5 or $6 an hour?" As one operator summarized, the change to teams has
amounted to "more work for less money" for many of the staff.
Some workers are confident that are doing their share to meet the production
goals, but experience stress nonetheless in the team system. The pressure for even
highly competent operators stems from their worries that their less able co-workers
will make them suffer losses in earnings and, in at least one case, from management
threats of layoffs if their team did not begin to produce more quickly. The efficient
operators expressed resentment over what they saw as punishment for their
competence; they were required to work even harder, sometimes at several different
operations, to compensate for the slack created by the slow producers.
This shortcoming is ironic given that Levi's own training curriculum discusses
Psychologist Frederick Herzberg's principles of motivation, which include income and
job security. These and other ingredients were believed by Herzberg to be necessary
to assure workers' motivation; alone, he did not feel that were enough to stimulate
workers, but, he argued, their absence "demotivates" (cited in Perrow 1986, 91).
Payment by group piece-rate also continues to offer incentives based on
volume, and imposes a price on teams for devoting time to activities that fall outside
of the strict parameters of the production process. For example, engaging in extensive
cross-training and discussing topics other than immediate problems are both difficult to
justify for teams concerned with meeting immediate output requirements. The group
piece-rate is effective in helping reduce the build-up of partially completed inventory,




The introduction of job rotation has required plants to re-train experienced
operators as well as adopt a new method of instruction for recent hires. The goal is
for every individual to be able to perform three operations to make possible a flexible
deployment of labor. At the Airways plant, for example, remuneration for newly hired
employees is attached to their competence in multiple operations. Operators hired
since AMS began must attain 100% efficiency on one operation, and 80% on two
others to earn team pay. While the plant still employees several instructors who work
with new employees, some of the responsibility for training has been transferred to the
teams. This has enabled the plant to cut 25% off of the previous period allotted for
learning only one operation in the assembly line. In addition, the head instructor at
one plant feels that her staff no longer insists that operators learn one "right" way to
perform tasks, but instead urges them to find sewing methods that feel comfortable to
them. All plants have ceased using Levi's renowned blue books, developed for
training by engineering staff.
For experienced operators, the cross-training process is less structured; these
workers learn mostly from one another, based on the requirements of their team. If a
team needs another inseamer, they must decide who will be trained in that skill, and
then agree on a person who will be able to cover that person's former operation.
Thus, once one operator is moved from her station, a chain of cross-training is set in
motion. The decision to stop working in order to be trained in a new operation is not
made as easily for some workers as it is for others. This is partly because all tasks
are not equivalent in their degree of difficulty and the time it takes an operator to
become proficient. There is a financial incentive for new hires to learn those
operations with the shortest learning curve, so that they will be quickly raised to the
team wage. Workers who perform the most challenging operations often have
difficulty leaving their work station to be cross-trained, because their team may not
have anyone capable of filling in for them, and the group is wary about forsaking
short-term output in order to develop its members' skill base. Any rotation that occurs
for several of the inseamers, for example, is to other teams, where they perform the
same task, since each team often only has one inseamer, and their production schedule
may be easily disrupted by their absence.
Interdependence
While the low producing workers are under increased pressure to produce as
team members, operators who were enjoying high earnings in the assembly line often
feel that their pay should not be contingent on the performance of teammates, whom
they have little control over. Several operators at each plant expressed the desire to
move to other teams, but were not hopeful of the prospects. There is an official
procedure employees can follow if they wish to transfer to a different teams; they sign
up, and wait for an opening on one of the teams that they want to work with. The
operators I spoke with felt that this option was of limited use, however, since the
"good" teams rarely had openings.
The group peer pressure applied in the new system has made individual control
more elusive to workers, and lacking the commitment to the purpose of the change to
teams, almost all said they find the interdependence stressful. One worker explained
that "I enjoy my work but I don't like having to worry about what the rest of the team
is doing." Workers are also uncomfortable with the pressure to maintain a steady
work pace throughout the day. One operator conveyed her unhappiness with this
change, explaining that "before, if I wanted to work hard in the morning, but felt tired
in the afternoon, I could slow down, and it was nobody's business. Now, we don't
have any choice." Although workers were aware that they were supervised in the
assembly line, they felt they were able to function relatively autonomously. While
responsibility for monitoring group output and quality has devolved to workers, they
feel more taxed because they believe they have ceded control over their pace and
earnings to 34 team members.
One general goal of team systems, particularly as practiced in the Swedish
sociotechnical approach, is to make the division of labor less fractured, so that goods
and services represent a collective process instead of merely the sum of a series of
discrete steps. Levi's own curriculum used for the plants' team work training declares
the company's commitment to overcoming "specialized, fractionated, repetitive and
routine" task assignments. The "Flying Starship" handbook stresses the need to create
"larger, enriched, relatively whole pieces of work" (Lytle and Weisbrod 1989, 18-19).
Yet, as practiced, AMS does not encourage individuals to move around and
spontaneously collaborate, and, while operators are no longer narrowly trained
specialists, the nature of their work remains unchanged. They still perform one,
discrete task on every piece in a 60 unit bundle, and then move the batch along to the
worker positioned at the next step in the sequence. This model of teamwork
corresponds to Charles Perrow's description of "co-acting," groups which he says
foster concurrent - but still individualistic - behavior (1986, 92).
Those workers who have enjoyed learning and performing other operations
attribute this to the reduced monotony and sense they gained that "the day goes faster
now." Several operators who felt restricted by the scarcity of others who could
perform their job said they would like to learn other operations. These individuals felt
that becoming more versatile would allow them to contribute more to their team, and
one cited the appeal of greater variety in fighting boredom. There was little
anticipation of job enrichment, however; as mentioned, tasks in the teams are as
narrowly prescribed as they were in the assembly line.
The standardized goods produced by the El Paso plants helps explain why their
teams are not exhibiting the features described in the company literature. The purpose
of cross-training and semi-autonomous teams is to ensure that the domestic plants have
the capacity to take on new designs without disrupting the entire flow of production.
The steady demand for the basic jeans they produce has given the El Paso plants little
need to vary production steps thus far. Since the equipment they use is designed for
traditional, "fractionated" tasks, they have not had the opportunity to put their
flexibility to the test. The importance of establishing adaptability may therefore be
somewhat abstract to workers and managers at this stage, and it remains to be seen
how they will fare if their ability to innovate is put to the test.
Soft Skills
Levi realizes that individual operators may have work habits or preferences
that, left unchecked, would interfere with their group's success. Accordingly, teams
are to engage in ongoing consensus-building, both on and off the plant floor. To help
workers make the transition from performing their jobs in isolation to interdependence,
each employee is given 40 hours of training in "soft skills." This instruction consists
of practicing presentation and communication skills, learning to run meetings, and
developing problem solving techniques. Managers hope that this training will equip
operators to interact constructively on the plant floor, and to run effective meetings off
the floor as well.
At one plant, however, they are having trouble even providing the prescribed
training course for all of the teams. In their rush to convert to AMS, they began
sending groups of four instead of entire teams through the training at one time, and,
postponed the training altogether for the last team. This "team" contains 64 workers,
and is the group whose structure most closely resembles a modified assembly line.
The team-building aspect of the training seems particularly relevant given the
configuration of this group and the others arranged in mini-lines, and the abbreviation
of training overall has lead to a predictable lack of cohesion in the teams.
Team Meetings
AMS calls for teams to meet "off line" weekly. However, time pressure as
well as the apparently raucous nature of early gatherings has led management at one
of the plants to curtail meetings; operators explained that they stopped holding
meetings soon after they began working in a team. Many operators from this site
agree with the decision to eliminate meetings. They don't believe that they can afford
the time to hold meetings, and explained that when problems arise that can not be
resolved on the floor, the parties involved go straight to the plant manager's office to
settle the matter.
Operators Suggest More Training
Most operators believe that the instruction they received in soft skills was
worthwhile, but feel more sessions are needed. All cited the difficulty in
communicating with co-workers, and some have chosen to confront one another while
others repress the urge, and remain silent. Workers' comments convey their
frustration with communication gaps; one operator said that "I used to say something
if I saw someone standing around, but I don't care anymore." She feels she no power
to effect others' behavior, but does state that more training might enable her to better
cope with her frustration. Levi workers' requests correspond with Appelbaum and
Batt's review of evidence from work reform literature, which indicated that, despite
many companies' emphasis on firm-specific, technical training, "employees and
managers indicate a much greater demand for training in process and behavioral skills"
(99).
Many workers cope with their inability to carry out "self direction" by
transferring responsibility for conflict resolution to their supervisors or cell leaders. At
one plant, problems are often taken directly to the plant manager for arbitration. One
cell leader there told me that he handles conflicts by informing his supervisor, who
then speaks with the line manager, who arranges a meeting among the parties in the
plant manager's office.
Employee Involvement
In addition to team meetings, employee involvement is also sought in Levi
plants in the form of voluntary participation in task forces. These groups are usually
composed of six operators and one or two managers or supervisors, and the matters
they address range from the plant parking shortage to disciplinary action for low
producers. A recent accomplishment of an Airways task force was the formulation of
a policy to address the problem of low producers. This task force was created at the
urging of management, after several workers complained about the uneven
performance of team members. They proposed a three step process (warning, then
monitoring, followed by improvement or dismissal), which was approved and adopted
by management. (The use of such a procedure would not be feasible in the union
setting, since it encroaches on contractual agreements.)
Task forces seem to be more functional at Airways (perhaps reflecting the role
of the union-management steering committee in addressing many of the same issues at
the Cypress plant), though managers acknowledged that they had been asking certain
individuals to participate rather than relying on the spontaneous formation of task
forces. The meetings' occurrence during work hours has prevented many operators
from joining a task force, and many workers from both sites were not aware of what
the task forces did, suggesting a need to disseminate information about their activities
more widely.
The focus of task forces and team meetings demonstrate a somewhat problem-
centered approach towards employee involvement. The solicitation of particular types
of operators to participate for task forces may also influence the issues they address
and the proposals they generate. One supervisor stated that she asked the "less
critical" workers to serve, and others reiterated the difficulty with having operators
who perform the critical tasks like inseaming and banding leave their stations for
meetings. Appelbaum and Batt argue that such a selective system is "significantly
different than one in which all workers are involved in day to day decisions" (1993,
87-88).
Off-line or parallel vehicles for employee participation have been the subject of
some controversy among researchers and labor advocates. Part of this debate stems
from the range of roles that these structures may offer workers; there is no standard
formula for soliciting employee involvement. While the Levi task forces currently
preserve managerial perogative, they may open the way for the development of a more
expansive role for employees in decision-making over time. Some scholars have cited
this potential as sufficient reason for workers to participate in employee involvement
schemes, even those that seem to offer workers limited voice or power (Kochan,
Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma 1991). However, as Kelley and Harrison point out,
the unequal distribution of power in worker-management committees may erode
employees trust and weaken their commitment to pursuing a greater role (1992, 254).
Team Leadership
AMS is designed for operators to coordinate the flow of production Output
levels and the group piece-rate are set by the joint labor-management committee in the
union plant, and by management, in consultation with an employee task force, in the
non-union site. The workers I spoke with from both sites felt as if output goals and
pay levels were issued from above, despited the role they are accorded in the planning
process. Production planning for most operators, therefore, consists of contributing to
their teams efforts to meet quota.
Each team does choose a leader and four cell representatives, who guide the
activities of the others. They serve for open-ended periods, and meet with
management weekly to assess their group's progress in meeting quota. Cell
representatives also function as trouble shooters on the floor, intervening when there
are bottlenecks, speaking to operators about switching jobs, arranging breaks, and,
overall, overseeing the smooth flow of parts through their team. In theory, these
leaders rotate periodically, and many operators will be able to serve in this role at
some point. However, the practice at both plants was somewhat more static. Like the
dilemma they face with leaving their station to learn a new operation, those workers
who perform operations which few other team members are trained for feel pressure to
remain at their station. For them, becoming a cell representative is seen as an
unnecessary diversion, which could interfere with their team's ability to meet quota.
Operators' Interpretation of the Change
Operators from each of the plants feel the change has not lived up to its initial
depiction by management. Several operators from the Cypress plant indicated that
they felt let down when they realized that this change was not going to relieve them of
the pressure of assembly line work as promised. One worker recalled that
management explained that the change was designed to allow operators to better
"balance their personal and professional lives." Another said they were told they
would simply not have to work as hard under the team system as they had in the
assembly line. This latter operator was prompted by this prospect to sign up for one
of the early "mini-lines," and her discovery that teamwork was more strenuous than
being on the assembly line left her embittered. An inseamer who felt mislead by
management's description of AMS wished that they would follow through on their
promise to train others in her operation so she could rotate more, because she feels
"the day goes faster when you learn more." This operator was anxious to be on one
of the early teams to avoid getting "stuck with" the older workers, who she believes,
"don't want to change."
Workers' interpretations of the change reflect little appreciation for the
company's stated interest in establishing flexibility to allow for rapid production
changes. Rather than echoing the company's dictum about human resources as the
new "competitive advantage" for domestic plants, employees seem to feel more
interchangeable and less valued for their unique skills. Workers also regard the new
system as a cost containment measure, and some remarked that it could ultimately
result in downsizing. One operator who told me that she felt "fortunate to be working
at a Levi plant, and even more fortunate to be working in a union plant" went on to
confide that she has "thought from the beginning that maybe this company does this
kind of work to get rid of workers."
Barriers to Successful Team Work
Managers' use of negative reinforcement in their explanations of the need for
converting to teams has not made workers feel they are truly "partners" in the change.
Their reliance on coercive tactics to convince workers that it is in their interest to
cooperate with the changes, manifested in frequent references to the danger of plant
closure and layoffs, has served to distance workers from the change. And perhaps
because they also remain less than convinced of the benefits of team manufacturing,
managers don't always convey to workers a sense of the possibilities AMS is designed
to allow, M., a line manager, recalled that the during the announcement of AMS,
workers were warned that "even this change is not a guarantee that these jobs will be
here in the future." Job insecurity is unlikely to motivate high performance in this
case, because workers reportedly do not feel that, as individuals, they have any control
over the fate of the plant. From their perspective, it is difficult to embrace a scheme
that is presented as a last attempt to save precarious jobs. Workers in this situation
are likely to cope with the uncomfortable feelings of vulnerability evoked by refusing
to become emotionally invested in the change process.
Finally, the lack of meaningful input from operators - both those in and and out
of the union - in the creation of the new system may detract from their commitment to
the change. Although some of the operators at the Airway plant were taken on visits
to other Levi plants with teams in place, their involvement in the overall design as
well as in their own plant's implementation of AMS was after the point when most
major decisions had been made, and was often informal. The union was not invited to
participate in the work reorganization, and has struggled to expand their role
throughout the conversion process. Both Levi and ACTWU have their own national
task forces on AMS; there is not one committee where leadership from both sides
come together. And while Levi executives speak optimistically about the potential for
a partnership with the union, the collaboration has been largely on the company's
terms thus far.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Making a final judgement about the impact of Levi's new system is complex.
In part, this complexity stems from the different priorities and interests of divisions
within Levi. In the preceding chapters, I have described how the implementation of
the team system has brought both benefits and problems for operators and managers in
the two El Paso plants I studied. In this last chapter, I address the significance of the
change for the Alternative Manufacturing System for these individuals, in terms of
their daily work environment as well as their long-term job security. I also assess the
performance of the team system from the perspective of the parent company, given its
stated goals and its past practices. I then turn to the views of plant employees, first
discussing the pressures on managers and supervisors, and then summarizing the
effects working in teams has had on operators in the El Paso plants.
In their evaluation of AMS, Levi executives recognize some of the same
shortcomings in implementing the new system that have been identified by workers,
such as widespread objections to the new pay methods and subsequent demoralization,
and uneven amounts of training among its plants. Yet, while it concedes that these
problems may interfere with a smooth transition to team work, the company continues
to hold its plants responsible for "getting the units out of the door" within strict time
limits. This suggests that some of the objectives Levi had at the outset of this project
have been met, and that they are not unduly concerned with addressing the plants'
difficulties. In fact, if judged by criteria such as quality, through-put time, and
projected labor cost savings, the implementation of AMS appears highly successful.
If, however, the goals such as flexibility and capacity to innovate are examined, the
achievements of AMS fall short of the company's stated intent.
The company's literature declares the importance of recognizing the creative
potential stored in workers, and criticizes the tradition of allowing machines to
determine the deployment of labor. Yet it will be difficult to foster innovation in the
El Paso plants, given their equipment and product mix as well as the minimal levels of
training and worker involvement. These factories' machines are designed for the
performance of minute tasks, and while the factories have rearranged the work stations
to accommodate the teams, the new layout does not overcome the rigid nature of the
technology. While they are learning to perform three sewing tasks, workers may not
be as adaptable or versatile as the company claims it would like them to be, and the
new system may not be succeeding in establishing the foundation for further change.
The organization of work stations in horseshoe formations and mini-lines is not
adequate to develop operators' ingenuity and willingness to try different techniques.
In the event that new styles are introduced into the plants, workers will have little
experience in varying their steps.
Imposing a collaborative system on a production process which still utilizes a
series of minutely defined steps has presented an enormous challenge to Levi's plants.
As it stands, the teams in the factories I studied have not been able to function as
intended. The production sites are understandably concerned with continuing to meet
the needs of the parent company, which remain based on high volume and fast
turnaround on orders. This has limited their ability to devote time to off-line activities
like soft skill training and team meetings, and discourages deviation from established
production techniques. Managers and supervisors are understandably reluctant to
encourage employees to sacrifice immediate contributions to output in order develop
the less tangible capacity to innovate. Since demand for the jeans both plants produce
is steady and their managers do not foresee acquiring orders for fashion-sensitive
goods in the near future, the need to become more flexible remains somewhat abstract.
This has contributed to an emphasis on the mechanics of setting up the teams, to the
neglect of building employees' group process skills and to making their participation
in decision-making a priority.
Plant managers are sent somewhat contradictory messages from corporate
headquarters. They are to invest time and resources in hard and soft skill-building, but
they must not disrupt their production schedule. Local managers may believe that the
team system has the potential to increase their long-term viability, but they feel a more
urgent need to avoid losing business from the parent company.
A number of consistent themes emerged in my discussions with operators from
the two plants. These views held by operators are in stark contrast to the image of
AMS presented in company literature, as well as by some plant-level managers, who
exhort the benefits of a more relaxed pace and varied jobs for operators. Heightened
stress levels and dissatisfaction with the new terms of compensation prevailed in both
plants. Workers attribute this to the shift from a system in which they had control
over their own output and effectiveness, to one wherein each individual's workload
and compensation hinges on the performance of 34 team members. Workers'
interpretation of the reasons the change was made, as well as their lack of formal
involvement in plant re-design, colors their attitudes about its implementation.
Ian Taplin contends that new work arrangements in garment factories often
"merely reconfigure" workers' skills, and that they are designed to achieve wage
depression and "productivity increases without overt management supervision." (14,
31) As implemented in the Airways and Cypress plants, team manufacturing has
increased the breadth of tasks operators perform, without thoroughly developing their
depth of knowledge and power. Not all jobs (particularly those entailing technical
expertise) are included in cross-training, perhaps because management feels the
investment in providing instruction for them would be prohibitive. And while
cooperation is necessary for the Levi teams to function, the content of individual tasks
has not changed. The group-based pay incentive has lowered the earnings of many
workers, and is widely blamed by operators for creating dissent, and for generating
more performance pressure than they felt in the traditional assembly line. Insufficient
training in group process skills like problem solving and communication have left
teams poorly equipped for self-management and uncomfortable with interdependence.
Their members still look to supervisors for leadership, and have become disenchanted
with the idea of resolving conflicts on their own.
The ability of operators to contribute to their team is still judged by relatively
traditional measures: speed and quantity. This increases the pressure on slow workers,
often older women who have over 20 years of experience at the plant, but who are no
longer able to match the pace of their younger counterparts. They feel they are now
under scrutiny from their peers, whereas in the assembly line they were only
accountable to management - and themselves.
Most operators regard the change as a cost cutting and quality enhancement
measure, and modest preparation for new practices such as job rotation and problem
solving has perhaps confirmed their doubts about the company's commitment to
worker empowerment. The regular incidence of plant flight, both by Levi and other
American companies, and managers' frequent reference to closing as a means of
gaining workers' cooperation with changes in work rules have also left operators
detached and cynical about company-lead changes.
The goals embedded in Levi's new system do not guarantee that domestic
plants will be instrumental in its implementation. The company's foremost desire is a
production process that will allow it to respond quickly to demand and save money,
not preserve manufacturing jobs in the U.S. Aside from their proximity to the U.S.
customer base, there is little reason to believe that domestic plants will always be able
to meet the responsive criteria more economically than offshore alternatives. Given
the indeterminate nature of their future, the best strategy for Levi's domestic factories
seems to be to use the new system to enhance their geographic value to the company.
This will require overcoming obstacles to the effectiveness of the Alternative
Manufacturing System, beginning with making training and employee participation
more integral to its functioning. Even if the company would like to use the domestic
plants as a prototype to test the team method, it will need to re-evaluate the short-term
time frame it fosters in plant leadership by requiring their adherence to traditional
production schedules.
The inability of most operators to make a smooth transition to a collective
work process does not mean that the team idea is fundamentally flawed; I have tried
to use their testimony to suggest ways that the implementation process could be
improved. And despite all of the problems raised in this thesis, the health benefits of
job rotation and the potential to effect plant-level policy are two major improvements
upon the traditional organization of work for operators. It remains to be seen whether
these advances can be starting points for more encompassing changes in the
workplace, or whether they will continue to be the best elements of a system that
blends the old with the new.
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